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ABSTRACT 
One of the most urgent problems with the US patent system is that there are too many patents of 
poor quality. Most blame the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) – its mistakes, overly 
generous grant rate, and lack of consistency. But, the quality and quantity of patents in force is 
the product of three sets of decisions: to submit an application of certain quality (by the 
applicant), to grant the patent (by the patent office), and to renew a patent and keep it in force 
(by the applicant/patentee). Startling, there is no consensus way to measure patent quality. This 
article addresses these shortcomings by developing new, comparative ways to measure patent 
quality, using the benchmark of the European Patent Office (EPO), viewed as the “gold 
standard” for patent quality. Tracking the progress of patent submissions, grants, and renewals, 
including of close to 100,000 applications filed at both the EPO and USPTO, it reveals subtle 
and thus far overlooked differences with implications for how the US should implement and 
prioritize improvements to patent quality.  
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COMPARATIVE PATENT QUALITY1 
On June 8, 1999, the Patent Office, like it does every Tuesday,2 published the names and 
numbers of newly issued patents.  Among them was the 6,032,137, a patent that described a way 
of depositing a check by imaging and sending it, rather than physically transferring it to the bank. 
3 The inventor, Claudio Ballard, tried for several years to develop the invention. He failed, but 
the technology thrived. After unsuccessful talks with JP Morgan Chase, Ballard’s company, 
DataTreasury, sued a dozen or so banks and companies for patent infringement.4 In 2003, 
Congress passed the “Check 21” Act, clearing the way for check imaging to become standard.5 
In February 2006, DataTreasury used the ‘137 and related patents and used them to sue 30 
banks.6 In 2010, after DataTreasury won its first lawsuit, including based on the finding that JP 
Morgan had knowingly infringed Ballard’s patents,7 Ballard was named inventor of the year.8  
In 2013, Fidelity National Information Services, after being sued by Ballard, asked the 
USPTO to take a second look at the Ballard patents. It agreed. In 2015, a panel of patent judges 
revoked the ‘137 patent as overly broad and vague, and therefore invalid.9 The Community 
                                                            
1 © Colleen Chien, 2016. I thank Deitmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers, Arti Rai, Norman Siebrasse, Tom Cotter, 
Fabian Gaessler, Melissa Wasserman, Mark Lemley, Jorge Contreras, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and audiences 
at Stanford, University of Washington, University of San Diego, and various other conferences for their comments 
and suggestions, and to Reuben Bauer, John McAdams, Theresa Yuan, Alita Carbone, Max Looper, Kali Frampton, 
Arun Sharma, Rajan Agrawal and Emma Stone for research assistance.   
2 With a few exceptions, since Tuesday, January 18, 1848 (correspondence with the USPTO on file with the author). 
3 U.S Patent No. 6,032,137 (issued Feb 29, 2000). 
4 Jennifer A. Kingson, Small Company is Specializing in Suing Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2004), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/25/business/small-company-is-specializing-in-suing-banks.html?_r=0. (Cases 
include: Data Treasury Corp v. First Data Corp, et al., N.D.Tex. 3:02-cv-02429; Datatreasury Corp v. First Data 
Corp, et al., E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv-00094-DF-CMC; DataTreasury Corp v. Electronic Data Sys, N.D.Tex. 3:02-cv-
02643-K; DataTreasury Corp v. Bank One Corporation, N.D.Tex. 3:03-cv-00059; Datatreasury Corp v. Ingenico 
S.A., et al. E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv-00095-DF-CMC; Datatreasury Corp v. J.P. Morgan Chase Co, et al., E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv-
00124-DF-CMC.) 
5 See Kingson, supra note ___. 
6 DataTreasury Corporation v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al., E.D.Tex. 2:06-cv-00072-DF-CE. 
7 Jim Hammerand, U.S. Bank Ordered To Pay $53 Million In Check Imaging Lawsuit, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL 
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2010/09/27/daily20.html (last visited 6/7/2016). 
8 DataTreasury Founder Claudio Ballard Named 2010 ‘Inventor of the Year’ by U.S. Business and Industry 
Council, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101005007171/en/DataTreasury-Founder-Claudio-Ballard-Named-
2010-%E2%80%9CInventor#.VgFXdBFVhBc (last visited 6/7/2016). 
9 Matthew Bultman, DataTreasury Patents Nixed by PTAB in AIA Review, Law360 (Apr. 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/649511/datatreasury-patents-nixed-by-ptab-in-aia-review (last visited 6/7/2016) 
(describing the invalidation of the ‘137 and 5,910,988 patents). 
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Bankers hailed the verdict “a victory for community banks.”10 By that time DataTreasury and its 
two employees had already collected $350M in licensing fees.11  
Patent 8,112,504, filed by James Logan and others, followed a similar path.12 In the 
1990s, Logan had attempted to develop an alternative to radio – a music player that would 
deliver music and content based on past listening habits. He failed.13 But through a series of legal 
maneuvers involving multiple patent examiners, Logan was able to get the ‘504 patent issued in 
2012, more than a decade after he first told the Patent Office about the invention.14 Logan used 
the patent to sue Apple Inc. multiple times,15 and demanded fees from dozens of podcasters.  
Podcasters like Marc Maron of the show “WTF” reacted strongly, saying of the campaign, “It’s 
serious bullshit.”16 The Electronic Frontier Foundation launched a “Save Podcasting” campaign, 
attracting over a thousand donors to fund the PTO’s legal review of the patent.17 On April 11, 
2015, the Office decided that it had been a mistake to issue the patent in the first place. The 
technology wasn’t novel – it had previously been invented by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, and was obvious in light of work CNN had done.18 
Stories like these contribute to the perception that one of the most – if not the most – 
significant problems with the patent system is that there are too many patents of poor quality.19 
Mistaken transfers, like the $350M paid from banks to DataTreasury’s invalid patents, lead to 
higher prices and a loss of consumer welfare.20 The dynamic effect of allowing patents over 
routine and incremental advances that would have happened anyway has led to the growth in 
                                                            
10 ICBA Applauds Patent Board’s Ruling against DataTreasury, INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA, 
(May 8, 2015), available at 
https://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=293787&navItemNumber=183939 (last visited 
6/7/2016).  
11 Alex Lawson, Controversial DataTreasury Patents Face Biz Method Review, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2013), available 
at http://www.law360.com/articles/487185/controversial-datatreasury-patents-face-biz-method-review (last visited 
6/7/2016). 
12 Joe Mullin, Infamous ‘’Podcasting Patent’’ Knocked Out, ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 10, 2015), available at 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/infamous-podcasting-patent-knocked-out-in-patent-office-challenge/ 
(last visited 6/7/2016). 
13 Id. 
14 File History of Patent 8,112,504 (available at http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair), showing that the ‘504 is a 
divisional of the 09/782,546 patent application, filed 02-13-2001, which in turn is a divisional of the 08/724,813 
application, filed 10-02-1996). 
15 Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc et al., (E.D.Tex. 2010), 9:09-cv-00111-RC; Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, 
Inc. (E.D.Tex. 2010) 9:11-cv-00120-RC; Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83746 (E.D. 
Tex. 2011). 
16 Marc Maron, Podcasters are Under Attack from Patent Trolls, WTF WITH MARC MARON (Mar. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.wtfpod.com/dispatches/entries/podcasters_are_under_attack_from_patent_trolls. 
17 Daniel Nazer, UPDATE: EFF Fights Patent Troll Demand for Save Podcasting Campaign Donor Information, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 31, 2014), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/eff-fights-
patent-troll-demand-eff-podcast-donor-information. 
18 PTAB Decision, EFF v. Personal Audio, LLC Case IPR2014-00070 (available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/uspto-decision) 
19 DataTreasury’s patents, in fact, motivated passage of the America Invents Act as described in Ryan 
Davis, Singled Out In Patent Bill, DataTreasury Files New Suit, LAW360 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/270394. 
20 See, e.g. 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___ , ch. 1, at 2.  
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certain types of patents outstripping the growth in R&D (see FIG__)21 and a more general tax on 
innovation, as small and large firms dedicate resources to filing applications to avoid having to 
pay licensing fees to others.22 The perception that the Patent Office makes many mistakes – 42% 
of the patents that are reviewed by courts,23 and a much higher share of patents that the Patent 
Office choses to review based on petitions are overturned24 – invites legal maneuvers and game 
playing by applicants. One such tactic involves refiling the same patent multiple times until a 
favorable outcome is achieved 25– even if it takes over a decade, as in the case of the podcasting 
patent. 
Policy interest in patent quality has reached a new high recently, as the growth in patent 
litigation based business models has attracted the attention of Congress,26 Supreme Court 
justices,27 President Obama,28 and numerous government agencies including the Federal Trade 
Commission,29 and Department of Justice.30 In 2015, the Director of the USPTO launched an 
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative,31 making patent quality the cornerstone of her administration. 
That year, the House Judiciary Committee, with jurisdiction over the courts, initiated an 
investigation into “issues related to patent quality” and tasked the General Accounting Office 
with the production of lengthy reports on the topic.32 Volumes have been written about the 
                                                            
21 Infra Part II. 
22 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System (“Arms Race”), 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297 (describing the origins and practice of defensive patenting, 
the filing of patents in order to ensure freedom to operate and pay reduced license fees, by large and small firms). 
23 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and David R. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1769, 1787 (2014) 
24 Patent Public Advisory Committee Quarterly Meeting: Patent Trial and Appeal Board Update, USPTO 3 (Feb. 
19, 2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150219_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf 
(showing that 84% of IPR cases have all or some of their claims invalidated). 
25 Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.L.R. 63, 66-71 (2004). 
(describing and critiquing the practice of allowing applicants to seek without limit review of their patent 
applications), see also infra Part III. 
26 See, e.g. INNOVATION ACT, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013), which passed the House in 2013 with vote of 325 – 
91, and the low-quality patents and patent troll lawsuits that the Act was designed to address, as described at the 
Judiciary Committee Innovation Act website, available at https://judiciary.house.gov/the-innovation-act/ (last visited 
7/6/2016).  
27 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 and 399 (2006) Kennedy concurrence (noting the 
development of “firms [that] use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees,” and the enforcement of patents of “potential vagueness and suspect validity.”) 
28 See, e.g. The White House, President Obama Participates in a Fireside Hangout on Google+, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14, 
2013), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kp_zigxMS-Y  (calling for the development of “smarter 
patent laws” to address the problems caused by patent trolls, entities that “don't actually produce anything 
themselves. They're just trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort 
some money out of them.”)  
29FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
COMPETITION, 50-51, 137-48 (March 2011). 
30DEPT. OF JUSTICE and FED. TRADE COMM’N, PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES (December 2012), 
described at https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-workshop-patent-assertion-entity-activities (workshop 
website including public comments pertaining to patent assertion entities). 
31 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS 
INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY, Introduction (“2016 GAO Quality Report”), at 2 (June 2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678113.pdf. 
32 Id. at 7. 
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costs33 and causes of low patent quality, including apparent defects, for example, in patent law,34 
patent procedures,35 and institutional incentives.36  
But problems of low patent quality, while urgent, are not new.  Independent government 
reviews in 1990, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2015, and 2016 each found serious problems with the 
USPTO’s quality processes.37 The Patent Quality Review Office at the USPTO was created in 
1974 to address quality concerns.38 Patent examination as we know it today was introduced in 
1836 to remedy the previous system’s defect of registering patents without applying any quality 
filters at all, “deluging the country with worthless monopolies and laying the foundation for 
endless litigation,”39 according to a Senate report. The patent registration system that preceded it, 
in turn, was motivated by the challenges that the first patent examiners – a board comprised of 
the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of War, among them the Founding 
Fathers of the United States – met in trying to thoroughly examine patent applications despite 
their demanding schedules.40  
Yet patent quality issues have persisted. Why? First, we lack the ability to measure patent 
quality. That is to say, there is no consistent definition of, much less any consensus way of 
measuring, patent quality. 41 This omission is as crippling as it is startling, making it impossible 
                                                            
33 See, e.g., 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___, at 4 (describing the anticompetitive effects of low-quality patents 
including unwarranted market power and unjustifiable cost increases); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua 
Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011) (expressing concern 
over the outsized impact, and high invalidity rate, of patents that are asserted more than eight times). 
34 See, e.g., 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___ , at 10–12 (recommending the elevation of obviousness standards 
in US patent law); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 
1590 (2011) (also recommending elevated obviousness standards); Mark A. Lemley & Doug Lichtman, Rethinking 
Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that in light of low patent quality, 
patents shouldn’t be given the presumption of validity). 
35 See, e.g., Michael Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing 
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data (“Time Allocated”), (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20337, 2014) (blaming time pressures in patent examination for the 
issuing of marginal patents); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1541 (2009) (blaming the USPTO’s “monopoly” on assessing patentability for producing for poor-quality 
patents). 
36 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (2009) 
(describing the patent system incentive’s support of large numbers of low-quality patents).  
37Seven Criteria for Evaluating the Patent System, in A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, 
Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004), at 49-50  (describing government quality audits in 2000); PETER 
DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 72 (2010) (describing 
independent reviews in 1990 and 1997); Report in Brief, OFFICE OF INSP. GEN. U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (April 2015), 
available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-15-026-A_Abstract.pdf; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN SEARCH CAPABILITIES AND BETTER 
MONITOR EXAMINERS' WORK  (2016) (“2016 GAO Search and Monitoring Report”), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-479.  
38 Merrill et al., supra note ___, at 50.  
39Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4. (1836), available at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_for_Bill_ 
No_293.pdf.  
40 P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Society 161 
(Mar. 1993). 
41 Described infra in Part I.  
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to tell whether anecdotes like the ones described earlier are indicative of a broader problem with 
quality, and whether policy interventions like the ones currently being applied are working, or 
not. Second, while many lament poor patent quality, the incentives in patent examination are 
stacked in favor of a patent being granted42 whether or not the invention deserves it. Patent 
lawyers are paid to succeed, not fail, in getting patents for their clients. As much as patent 
examiners are committed to thoroughly vetting applications, the USPTO is rewarded when it 
grants, rather than denies applications, leading to maintenance revenues43 and skirting appeals 
and reversals.44 Third, patent quality is hard. Reviewing a patent application and discerning 
whether the invention has been done before or is obvious from the perspective of an artisan in 
the field, as required by law, is a challenging task.45 Even Thomas Jefferson struggled with it, 
writing in 1813, "I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth 
to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."46 It is not 
always clear that getting patent quality right is worth the effort – many and perhaps most patents 
are economically worthless.47 
This paper does not presume to offer a silver bullet to a problem that is as old as the 
patent system. However it takes the position that before we can expect to make a dent in patent 
quality, we need to address these first order problems. It proposes borrowing an age-old practice 
– benchmarking – to do so. Because while patent quality is a major focus in the United States 
patent system, it has been a priority in other countries as well.48 And so looking at the 
comparable experiences of one jurisdiction in particular – the European Patent Office (EPO), 
whose jurisdiction is comparable to the USPTO’s in size49 and which in recent years has come to 
be viewed by many as the “gold standard” in patent quality50 – is instructive and also, helpful for 
overcoming several of the long-standing obstacles that confront patent quality theory and 
practice.  
First, a comparative view provides a way to actually measure patent quality. Claims 
about patent examination, for example, that the resources devoted to patent examination are 
                                                            
42 Wagner, supra note ___, generally. (arguing that by its design, the modern patent system favors the seeking and 
granting of patents of low quality).  
43 Michael Frakes & Mellissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical 
Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns (“Agency Funding”), 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013) (finding that the PTO 
acts, in part, on financial incentives that favor the issuance of patents in order to receive maintenance fees on 
patentability decisions). 
44 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) (arguing that the USPTO’s ability to avoid costly 
appeals and reversals by overgranting leads to an inflationary pressure in the patent system). 
45 See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note __ , at ___ (describing the task of vetting patent applications as 
“herculean”). 
46 Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Aug. 13, 1813), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
47 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that the 
insignificance of most patents does not support greater investment in their quality). 
48 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the RuleMaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002) (describing patent quality reform agendas in Japan and 
Europe). 
49 See infra Part I. 
50 See infra Part I.  
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inadequate51 are oft made but rarely supported. But the use of benchmarks can reveal the extent 
and direction of the difference, if any, between the US and EPO “high standard” practice within 
any particular area. Second, though the details vary, the basic dynamic of ex parte examination in 
which “under-resourced patent-officers…struggle against well-heeled patent-lawyers”52 applies 
across patent offices. The specific practices the EPO uses to counterbalance the tilt towards 
granting and yet achieve the highest quality ratings can yield useful insights. Finally, because 
EPO examiners face the same basic challenge in vetting their applications as their USPTO 
counterparts, studying both sets of procedures can offer insights regarding the balance between 
high levels of patent quality and other interests such as cost and speed.  
Several recent developments vastly improve the case for doing comparative research in 
patent quality. In support of international markets, companies have long sought protection in 
multiple jurisdictions for the same invention.53 But tracing the fates of the same application in 
different jurisdictions has historically been impossible because the United States did not publish 
unsuccessful patent applications. That changed in 2002, when the United States implemented 
pre-issuance publication,54 which, including time for the completion of the application cycle, 
now enables the study of these natural experiments.  
Differences between American and European patent systems compromise the usefulness 
of comparing them. But a number of gaps have been smoothed recently, through the America 
Invents Act of 201155 and the America Inventor Protection Act of 1999.56 On the procedural 
side, the USPTO and EPO, as well as other international patent offices, have introduced a 
number of collaborative initiatives,57 making it more likely that comparative insights may be 
actionable despite the cultural and other differences that remain.58 
This paper exploits these developments to empirically compare and contrast patent 
quality in the US and Europe and to explore the policy levers that contribute to these differences. 
                                                            
51 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t 
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 
944 (2004) (describing the oft-made claim that examiner resources are inadequate). 
52 Time to Fix Patents (Leader), THE ECONOMIST(Aug. 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-
rewarding-them-time-fix. 
53 See, e.g., studies by Jensen et al., described infra in Part II. 
54 Stuart Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy In Patenting? Evidence From The American 
Inventor’s Protection Act Of 1999, (unpublished manuscript), at 1, 5, & 23 (2014) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170555) (describing the transition to a pre-issuance publication 
in 2002 brought by the America Inventor Protection Act). Because the Act allows certain inventors to keep their 
applications secret, an estimated 7.5 % of patent applications are not published. Id, at 1. 
55 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A New Paradigm for International 
Harmonisation?, 24 SING. ACAD. OF L.J. 669, 679 (2012).  
56 Graham and Hegde, supra note ___ at 2 (describing the introduction in the US of the 18-month publication 
requirement existing in Europe and elsewhere). 
57 USPTO Worksharing Programs and Proposals, USPTO 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/global/patents/Worksharing.pdf (describing, e.g. the launch of the IP5, an 
information-sharing and coordination initiative among the USPTO, EPO, and three other patent jurisdictions, and 
the formation of the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) for sharing search results). 
58 See discussion infra in Part I. 
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It takes as its unit of analysis all US and EPO patent applications with a priority date in 2002, a 
year we chose because enough time has elapsed that the status of the vast majority of patent 
applications is resolved.59 In addition, because the US only began publishing patent applications 
in 2001, 2002 was the first full year for which US application data was available.  The paper 
proceeds as follows. 
Part I discusses what patent quality is and why, historically, it’s been hard to measure, 
reviewing the deficiencies in measures like reversal rate, allowance rate, examiner inconsistency 
and pendency. It makes the case for applying a comparative perspective to patent quality, while 
acknowledging some of the limitations of such an approach. It applies this perspective to patent 
filings in 2002 to reveal that, consistent with the perception that there are too many US patents of 
questionable quality, there are projected to be 10 times more US patents in force than by 2022 
than EPO patents.  However, while the Patent Office is typically blamed for the existence of too 
many low-quality patents, our analysis shows the surprising result that the decisions of applicants 
in the pre-grant and post-grant periods, not the Patent Office during examination, contribute even 
more to the gap between EPO and US in force patents.  
Working from the empirical baseline set by Part I, Parts II through IV explore the gaps 
between US and EPO patenting, and the doctrinal, procedural, and institutional levers that 
explain them. Each part contemplates the insights that may be gleaned from the comparative 
view and discusses how they may be leveraged to improve US patent quality.  
Patenting proceeds in three stages – application, examination, and post-issuance; choices 
made during each of them have implications for patent quality. This article begins by examining 
quality (and quantity) levers at the patent application stage in Part II. It finds that, in 2002, there 
were roughly two times more EPO than US patent applications, and traces this difference to a 
number of trends within and outside of the patent system. These include the growth in computer-
enabled business models, the challenge of vetting software applications, and the proliferation of 
defensive and portfolio patent strategies. The relatively greater subject matter eligibility and 
relatively lower fees of the US system have made it more accessible and open, this paper argues, 
but also heighten the pressure on its quality filters, an insight that has largely been 
unacknowledged.  
Moving to the patent examination process, and the heart of this paper’s comparative 
analysis, Part III considers quality levers at the patent application stage from the perspective of 
99,221 EPO and US application pairs (applications filed in both jurisdictions) from 2002. The 
fine-grained analysis presented in this part reveals several novel insights. First, it finds that the 
EPO granted patents at a considerably lower rate than the US, on the same applications (50% 
EPO vs. 75% US),60 seemingly consistent with the hypothesis that US examiners are more 
                                                            
59 Based on inspection of the legal status data for 7,417 EPO applications filed in September 2002, we found that 
about 6% of the EPO applications were still pending. The remainder of the applications were either granted, 
withdrawn, or refused. Granular legal status information is not available in bulk form for USPTO applications, 
however, we used PATSTAT to determine how many applications had matured into patents (N=5,542), and our 
analysis of the file histories of 295 of the remaining 1,876 applications, suggests that 95% of them were resolved. 
60 Discussed infra at Part I. 
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lenient. Surprisingly, however, it finds that the gap in allowance rates is driven as much by the 
behavior of applicants who voluntarily withdraw their applications from the EPO as it is by 
examiner rejections. These withdrawals, this paper finds, are often, in turn, based on the EPO’s 
highly regarded search reports, whose citation of non-patent literature is almost double that of 
US examiners (30% EPO vs. 15% PTO), as well as the consistency and certainty that the EPO’s 
team-examination and “once and done” approaches produce. Part III concludes with a discussion 
of the implications of these findings for US prosecution. 
It may seem that once a patent is granted, its quality is fixed. However, while neglected 
by numerous studies of patent quality, the post-grant period, and choices made by patent holders 
and third parties, have a direct bearing upon the quantity and quality of patents that are in force 
and can help or hinder innovation. As Part IV reports, by year 20, an estimated 12% of European 
country patents based on EPO grants remain in force, vs. 37% of US patents, contributing more 
to the gap in the quantity of patents in force than differences in grant rate.  Post-grant review 
procedures initiated by third parties, applicant choices, in response to relatively high EPO and 
relatively low USPTO fee levels, and the robust secondary market for US patents all contribute 
to the quality and quantity of patent in force. In view of the industry dynamics that fuel the 
sustained demand for high-tech patents, the paper argues for further consideration of several 
novel interventions that, rather than reducing the number of poor-quality patents, would reduce 
the risks associated with poor-quality patents: the “defensive only” patent, in which patentees 
give up certain rights of assertion in exchange for lower fees, and a closer alignment of 
maintenance fees with social welfare, both of which are consistent with long-standing European 
practices.  
I. What Patent Quality Is and Why It’s Hard to Measure  
 
A. Defining Patent Quality  
Patent quality encompasses two concepts – (one hard:) avoiding legal mistakes in issuing 
(or declining to issue) a patent,61 and (one really hard:) ensuring that society is better off in 
granting rather than denying a patent.62 The two concepts are separate, but related. While legal 
mistakes, for example, a patent over podcasting even though it’s been done before, generally 
                                                            
61 The most common definition of a quality patent is a valid patent. See e.g. Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, 
A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (March 
2012), Drahos supra note ___ at 69 (describing quality patent as a legally correct patent). 
62 As articulated, e.g. by Duffy and Abramowicz, supra note ___ at ___. (arguing that a patent should only be 
awarded when it acts as an “inducement” for innovation), citing Judge Posner’s argument that, “the framers of the 
Constitution and the Patent Code would not have wanted patents to be granted where the invention would have been 
made anyway, and about as soon, without any hope of patent protection.” Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 
F.2d 796, 797(7th Cir.), vacated en banc, 723 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1983)), see also Mariagrazia Squicciarini, 
Helene Dernis, & Chiara Crisculo, Measuring Patent Quality: Indicators of Technological and Economic Value, 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2013/03 (2013) (proposing a wide array of patent 
quality metrics based on economic and technical, rather than legal criteria). 
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lead to the loss of social welfare, this loss can occur even if the decision to grant is technically 
correct.63  
To assess and effect measurable improvements to patent quality, patent quality needs to 
measureable. To date, however, there have been no consistent, agreed-upon ways of telling 
whether or not a particular patent, or a patent system, is high quality. In 2012, then-Director of 
the USPTO David Kappos publicly lamented the lack of a common quality standard, and the 
“balkanized approach” of different countries and patent offices to measuring patent quality.64 In 
2016, the General Accounting Office, based on an in-depth study of the USPTO, reported that 
despite the USPTO’s investments in quality, that the office “does not currently have a consistent 
definition for patent quality articulated in agency documents and guidance.’65  
Though easier to measure than the social welfare gain or loss produced by a patent, the 
rate of mistakes associated with patentability decisions remain elusive. For example, the USPTO 
conducts audits to determine the rate of legal errors, as evaluated by quality control specialists, 
and to ascertain how satisfied its “customers” (patent applicants) are.66 But these metrics are not 
independently calculated or observable. Citing the finding that under current criteria, most 
USPTO examiners are considered “above average” and, since 2011, have a better chance of 
being rated as “outstanding” or “commendable” with respect to patent quality, a 2015 
government report described the USPTO’s quality policies as “ineffective.”67 The academic and 
policy conversation has focused on several other measures of patent quality – reversal rate, grant 
rate, and consistency in patent examination. As discussed below, each of these has serious 
shortcomings. 
1. Reversal Rate 
One indicia of quality is the extent to which issued patents are overturned, in proceedings 
such as the USPTO “second look” programs used to invalidate the podcasting and check imaging 
patents described at the outset of this article. In inter partes review proceedings, 84% of 
adjudicated patents have at least one claim canceled.68 However, this number is the product of 
selection effects, and only applies to claims that the USPTO chooses to review and that the 
parties don’t work out on their own. 69 When these filters are applied, only 25% of challenged 
                                                            
63 Though not the focus of this paper, the same may be true of a patent application that fails to claim statutory 
subject matter, but would enhance, on net, social welfare. 
64  Stuart Graham & David Kappos, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent Quality, 53 MIT-SLOAN MGMT. 19 
(Spring 2012) (laying out the pathway to a more consistent, unified approach to patent quality) 
65 2016 GAO Quality Report, supra note ___ , at 2. 
66 2016 GAO Quality Report, supra note ___ , at ___. 
67 OFFICE OF INSP. GEN. U.S. DEP'T OF COM, supra note ___ , at ___. 
68 James Donald Smith & Scott Boalick, Patent Public Advisory Committee Quarterly Meeting: Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board Update, 15 (Feb. 19, 2015), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150219_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf. 
69 For a description of the process and selection effects, see e.g. Colleen V. Chien and Chris Helmers, Inter Partes 
Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, ___ STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  
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patent claims are invalidated.70 When post-grant challenge outcomes at the EPO, which is seen 
as generating the highest quality patents, and at the USPTO, are compared, their outcomes are 
not statistically distinguishable.71  Litigation outcomes suffer similar selection effects – the very 
small handful of patents that are actually worth fighting about and sufficiently uncertain that the 
parties do not settle are generally of higher value, and are not necessarily representative of all 
issued patents.    
2. Allowance Rate 
A simpler description of the problem is that the USPTO too readily grants patents, 
applying such a low bar that a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich72 and a method of 
swinging on a swing73 have qualified. To manage public perception, the Patent Office created a 
secret “sensitive application program” in 1994 to flag applications that seemed “trivial, mundane, 
frivolous… silly or extremely basic.”74 The program only applied to 0.04% of applications and 
was retired when it came to light in 2015.75 However, it is striking because it shows that the 
chances of implausible applications over “a method for curing baldness” or “a perpetual motion 
machine” becoming patents under standard Office procedures were significant enough that a 
program to reduce them was needed.76 Whether the initiative succeeded or not is an open 
question. During the program’s tenure, the Office issued patents over ideas such as using a 
computer to facilitate and record communication between a doctor and patient77 and a cure for 
cancer that combines “evening primrose oil, rice, sesame seeds, green beans, coffee, meat, 
cheese, milk, green tea extract, evening primrose seeds, and wine” entitled “Diane’s Manna.”78 
But determining what the PTO’s “actual” grant rate is, much less what it should be, has 
proven elusive. One cannot simply compare applications to grants within a single year because it 
takes several years and sometimes even decades for a patent application to resolve, and the 
number of applications rises every year.  That, unlike anywhere else in the world, it’s impossible 
to finally reject a US patent application, further complicates attempts to discern the fates of a set 
of applications. Following a cohort of patent applications filed in 2001, Lemley and Sampat 
found that despite criticism that the USPTO is issuing too many bad patents, the Office “rejects a 
                                                            
70 USPTO, Inter Partes Review Petitions Terminated to Date (Apr. 30, 2015), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_partes_review_petitions_%2004%2030%202015_0.pdf 
(finding 25% of challenged claims unpatentable) 
71 In both European opposition, and post-grant US reexamination, both of which lack an initiation filter, about 60-
65% of challenged patents are either amended or rejected, and in 25-30% of the cases, all the claims are rejected and 
the patent is revoked. See Chien and Helmers, supra note ___, at *___. 
72 U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued December 21, 1999). 
73 U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (issued April 9, 2002). 
74 Joe Mullin, USPTO Ends “Warning System” for Outlandish Patents, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2015), available at 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/uspto-ends-program-for-patents-that-could-create-unwanted-media-
coverage/.  
75 Sensitive Application Warning System, USPTO (March 2015), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patent-application-initiatives/sensitive-application-warning-system 
76 Id.  
77 US Patent No. 8,762,173, titled “Method and Apparatus for Indirect Medical Consultation,” (issued June 24, 
2014). 
78 US Patent No. 8,609,158 (issued December 17, 2013). 
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surprisingly high percentage of patents,”—about a third of them.79 Quillen and Cotropia have 
tracked the grant rate over time and report higher, though varying, rates of issuance – more than 
90% for most years between 1996 and 2014, except for a decline to less than 70% during the 
tenure of USPTO Director Jon Dudas. 80 The PTO’s own economists estimate the grant rate to be 
around 56%81 during this period but do not take into account the variety of ways in which 
applicants can continue examination even after a patent has been finally rejected. As described 
earlier, over half of the time patents are granted following “final” rejection, sometimes without 
any changes.82 However, while there is some evidence that the USPTO has a tendency to over-
grant patents on the improper basis of the agency’s finances, rather than the merits,83 and that 
patent offices in general favor their own nationals, over others,84 there is no consensus about 
what an agency’s overall grant rate should be. 
3. Examiner Inconsistency  
 A number of studies have documented the variation among examiners and examination at 
the USPTO. They generally find that a number of factors that have nothing to do with the 
importance of the invention or strength of the application can have a significant influence on 
how the patent application is examined at the USPTO and whether it is allowed. Examiner 
factors include how long the examiner has been at the PTO,85 when the examiner was hired by 
the patent office,86 the number of patents the examiner has examined, 87 experience levels,88 and 
the amount of time given to form a rejection.89 Some examiners are perceived to be too easy, 
while others are “too hard.”90 But as troubling as a high level of inconsistency in examination is, 
it provides only an indirect measure of patent quality. Further, like grant rate, there is no 
                                                            
79 Mark Lemley and Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp, 58 EMORY L. J. 181 (2008). 
80 Cotropia and Quillen, Patent Applications and the Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as of FY 
2014 (Intellectual Property Institute Research Paper No. 2015-01), available at http://law.richmond.edu/docs/FY-
2014-Update-Figures-and-Tables-1996-2014-29.pdf.  
81 Michael Carley, Deepak Hedge and Alan C. Marco, What is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent? 17 YALE 
J. L. & TECH. 203 (2015). 
82 Zhen Lei & Brain D. Wright, Why Weak Patents? Rational Ignorance or Pro-“customer” Tilt? (CELS 2009 4th 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434275. 
83 Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman have done the most comprehensive examination of this topic, and 
published their findings through several influential including Frakes and Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note 
___  and Michael Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. __. [add parentheticals] 
84 Paul H. Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya, & Elizabeth Webster Webster, Patent Examination Outcomes and the 
National Treatment Principle, 45 RAND J. ECON. 449, 452 (2014) 
85 Iain M. Cockburn, Samurl Kortum, & Scott Stern, Are all Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent 
Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19 (Wesley M. Cohen 
& Stephen Merrill eds., 2003). See also Ronald Mann,  The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience 
and Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2176 (2014). (finding the variation between Examiner to be relatively slight, 
but documenting the relative importance of tenure, over experience, to the examination). 
86 Frakes, Michael and Melissa Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 Duke L.J.___ (forthcoming 2016) 
87 Cockburn et al, supra note ___, at ___.  
88 Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. OF ECON. 
AND STAT. 817, 827 (2012). 
89 Frakes and Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note ___ at ___. 
90 Shine Tu, Unluck/Luck of the Draw: An Empirical Analysis of Examiner Allowance Rates, 20 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 10 (2012). 
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consensus about how much consistency would be desirable, and limited information about the 
tradeoffs between consistency and other aspects of the management of patent examination, 
including cost and hiring. The size of the patent backlog and variations in the pendency of 
patents have also been cast as matters of patent quality,91 insofar as untimely patent examination 
is considered to be low-quality patent examination. 
B. Towards a Comparative Approach to Patent Quality 
Although each is imperfect, together, existing approaches provide a wish list of sorts for 
measuring patent quality. Patent quality metrics should be independently calculable and 
observable by neutral third parties, not those with vested interests.92 They should provide 
accurate representations of applicant and examiner behavior in a large number of cases, unlike 
the reversal rates of the handful of patents that are adjudicated by the court or PTO. In order to 
inform patent improvement efforts, patent process indicators, like examiner consistency or 
pendency, must be measured in way that their bottom-line impact on patent quality can be 
understood. Finally, patent quality metrics should bear upon not only the behavior of patent 
examiners, but also the behavior of patent applicants and patent holders, and their contributions 
to quality.  
Structured correctly, comparative patent metrics satisfy a number of these criteria. 
Tracing what happens when the same patent applications are filed in multiple jurisdictions 
enables neutral, third party comparisons of the diverse fates of these patents that is observable in 
the public record.  Since 1996, the five Patent Offices have collected and published statistics on 
several patenting milestones, enabling direct comparisons that include all applications, issuances, 
and in-force patents,93 not just a subset of them. The collaborative reports of the so-called “IP5” 
(US, Japanese, European, Korean, and Chinese Patent Offices) provide year-over-year, 
standardized views of the production of all patents, at the level of patent technological classes, as 
well as the processes of patenting (including fees),94 supporting comparisons across time and 
jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
91 See, e.g. Marc Adler, Patent Quality Taskforce (2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/advisory/ppac/patent_quality_tf_report.pdf 
92 Kappos and Graham, supra note ___, at Recommendation 3 (calling for independent analysis). 
93 IP5 Statistics Reports, fiveIPoffices (2014),  http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports.html (listing 
reports of the IP5 Patent Offices from 2011, and from 2006-2010, from the IP3 Offices of the EPO). 
94 Statistical Data Resources, fiveIPoffices (2011-2016), http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticaldata.html.  
Patents in Force
Patent Application 
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Being able to track patenting at different phases in a patent’s lifecycle has another 
benefit. Existing patent quality metrics tend to focus exclusively on the behavior of the patent 
office – its mistakes, too-high grant rate, and lack of consistency. But the quality and quantity of 
patents in force is the product of three sets of decisions: to submit applications of certain quality 
to the patent office (by the applicant), to grant the patent (by the patent office), and to keep 
pursuing or keep in force, a patent (by the applicant/patentee). For example, neither the US 
podcasting nor the US check imaging patent discussed at the beginning of this article was ever 
the subject of a counterpart European patent, but decisions by the applicant as well as by the 
European Patent Office produced this outcome. The application that matured into US Patent 
6,032,137 over check imaging, for example, was also the basis of seven patent applications at the 
EPO,95 but none were granted.96 Patent protection outside the US over the ’504 podcasting patent 
was never even sought.97 To understand the impact of both examiner and applicant decisions on 
patent quality, it is important to observe, and compare metrics at each of the main three phases of 
a patent’s life – application, examination, and renewal. The sections below do so, but only after 
explaining why the EPO provides the best point of comparison, despite the limits of a 
comparative approach.  
C. Why Compare the US and EPO 
Among options for comparing the US to with respect to patent quality, the EPO stands 
out. The GDP of the EPO’s 40 member states98 is roughly equivalent to the GDP of the United 
States99, and the EPO has about double the population of the US.100 The EPO is widely 
recognized as the “gold standard” in patent quality among patent examiners and practitioners. 
Industry surveys conducted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015-2016 have each consistently found 
the EPO to have the highest ratings among the five leading Patent Offices around the world.101 
This perception is robust across the subgroups surveyed – companies, patent lawyers, and non-
                                                            
95  See “Also Published As” section of http://www.google.com/patents/US6032137 (listing related applications 
EP1008086A2,EP1008086A4, EP1688876A2,EP1688876A3, EP1986148A1,EP2267652A1, EP2267653A1) 
96 Id. (showing no “B” (or granted) EP publication). 
97 http://www.google.com/patents/US8112504 (see list of related applications, showing only US applications). 
98 The EPO includes EU member states and a number of others including Albania, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Macedonia, 
Monaco, Slovenia, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See IP5 2014 report for a list of members (available at 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/chapter2.pdf), at page 5 
99 See "World Economic Outlook Database". International Monetary Fund. April 2016. (estimating US GDP in 2015 
to be $18.6T, as compared to $17.8T including the European Union, Turkey, and Switzerland). 
100 The combined population of the EPO member states is about 619M 
(http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/chapter2.pdf, page 5), while the US population 
is 320M (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).  
101 Intellectual Asset Management Magazine surveys (available at the following links, some behind firewall 2011: 
http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=4ae808a6-8240-41bf-a6e0-9b1828bfe372; 2010: http://www.iam-
media.com/Magazine/Issue/42/Cover-story/The-state-of-play; 2012: http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=f7470c76-8fe7-42e3-a4bb-fce2b4fa1a17; 2015: 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/4783c6465d9a2b5fc1257e5900242b3f/$FILE/IAM72_benc
hmarking_q_p_en.pdf ; 2016: http://www.iam-media.com/Magazine/Issue/78/Features/Hard-times-in-the-global-
patent-market-but-hope-too-in-places)  
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practicing entities.102 Based on interviewing about 140 examiners from countries all around the 
world from the period covering 2004-2008, Peter Drahos found that the EPO had the best 
reputation, including for its searching capabilities and esprit de corps – the personal pride 
examiners took in the quality of their work product.103   
But while Europe may be closer to the US than other patent jurisdictions, significant 
differences remain. As detailed later, the two systems are different in law, procedure, and 
administration, and to some degree that is actually the point, to look at how such differences 
translate into different outcomes. In Parts III and IV, for example, we explore the consequences 
of the Europe’s “once and done” approach to examination, as opposed to the US’ approach of 
allowing patent-seekers to continue examination even after final rejection, as well as the 
relatively more aggressive schedule of renewal fees in Europe than the US, as departure points 
for considered discussion.  
We also acknowledge, however, that some differences are much harder to compensate for 
than others. Examiner salaries must follow US Civil Service grades.104 At the European Patent 
Office,105 the average examiner gets nearly double the salary of her American counterpart and is 
exempt from national taxes.106 Buoyed by the strong demand for technical and legal talent in the 
US, US patent examiners often have opportunities to advance professionally by leaving the 
USPTO to become patent lawyers or an engineer at a startup or existing firm,107 whereas EPO 
examiners tend to view EPO jobs as prestigious and conferring lifetime tenure.108 Because the 
USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority, anytime it does something that appears to 
heighten the burden on applicants109 it is vulnerable to claims by patent applicants, sometimes 
bitterly contested legal ones, that it is overstepping its authority.110  While the EPO and USPTO 
have similar GDPs, European patents must be perfected and enforced in individual countries 
whose markets are much smaller than the US. 111 Finally, the EPO is also continuously evolving, 
making it a moving target at best.112  
                                                            
102 See id., e.g. 2015 survey at Tables 6-8 (showing EPO ratings to be consistently highest).  
103 Drahos supra note ___ , at 62, 74 
104 Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems, 20(6) INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE, 
1755, at 1776–7, OD3.4: Incentives (wages and social recognition). 
105 Id. 
106 Pierre Picard & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Patent Office Governance, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
DP8338 (2011), at 17, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815813. 
107 Drahos, supra note ___ at ___. 
108 Id. 
109 For example, by requiring more fulsome disclosure or the up-to-date disclosure of a patentee’s owner, or to limit 
the options of patentees to get multiple chances to get a patent granted, 
110 Arti K.Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUSTON L. REV. 503, 
506 (2013) (describing the controversy within the patent community and suit, Tafas v. Dudas, against the USPTO 
over proposed changes to the so-called “continuation rules.”) 
111 See IP5 2014 report, supra note ___, at Sec. 5 (describing the process of perfecting and enforcing European 
patents). 
112 See e.g. Katrin Cremers, Max Ernicke, Fabian Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers, Luke McDonagh, 
Paula Schliessler, and Nicolas Zeebroeck, Patent litigation in Europe, EUR. J. OF L. AND ECON. (2016): 1-44. 
(discussing the anticipated introduction of the “European Patent” to the EPO, changing the enforcement of patents 
from being country-by -country to being effective across the member states of the EPO). 
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Differences both within and outside the control of patent system administrators and 
patent policy mean that particular insights gleaned below may be actionable to different extents, 
and based on varying degrees of effort. With this important caveat in mind, the next part of this 
paper details our methodological approach for carrying out the empirical portion of comparison, 
then implements it.  
1. Methodological Approach  
Empirical analyses of patents are limited by the quality and completeness of available 
data, and those issues are compounded in comparative studies. Fortunately, analyses of patents 
filed in multiple jurisdictions have been of interest for several decades,113 and I, working together 
with a team of research assistants, draw primarily on familiar approaches and data sources to 
carry out our comparison. For numbers of patents applied for and granted, the legal status of 
claims, and their technology classifications, we rely upon data provided directly by the USPTO 
and the EPO to PATSTAT, one of the most widely used patent databases for researchers.114 
PATSTAT was created by the EPO at the request of the international patent offices,115 and the 
data contained within it has several limitations, which we describe below.  
The European Patent Office was formed in 1978 and so continent-wide data is not 
available before then. The United States only began systematically publishing patent applications 
in March 2001, so this paper relies on application data reported in PATSTAT from then until 
June 2015.116 The technology field and sector data technology categories reported by PATSTAT 
are based on international patent classes whose definitions change often, and a patent is often 
assigned to more than one class (with the sector assignment based on the first, or primary, class), 
reducing the precision of technology category data.117 We rely on the technology field and sector 
codings provided by PATSTAT based on WIPO’s classification of patents into one of five 
sectors (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry (and pharmaceuticals), mechanical 
engineering, and other fields) and 35 fields devised by Schmoch.118 In focusing on patents 
applied for through the EPO, we exclude the minority of patent filings in each individual country 
pursued directly through national offices.119 We also exclude non-utility patents (e.g. design 
                                                            
113 Catalina Martínez C. Patent families: When Do Different Definitions Really Matter?. 86 SCIENTOMETRICS 39 
(2011), at 40 (describing work in the 1980s done by German economist Conrad Faust.  Comparisons have been 
used, for example, to identify valuable inventions (that are subject to multiple applications), understand trends in 
technological internationalization, and to compare patent filing strategies. (Martinez, at 4-6). 
114 As described, e.g. in Gianluca Tarasconi and Byeongwoo Kang, PATSTAT Revisited (IDE Discussion Paper No. 
527, 2015), available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/527.pdf 
115 Id.  
116 Updates to PATSTAT do not happen in real time, so the cut-off date for the data is sometime prior to June 2015. 
Even before this date, some subset of US patent applications can remain unpublished if the patentee is eligible to 
request non-publication, does so, and the application never matures into a patent. The share of patent applications 
that falls into this category is small. Graham and Hegde have found that the overwhelming majority of those who are 
eligible to keep their patent applications secret chose to forgo this secrecy. See Graham and Hegde, supra note ___.  
117 For all of these reasons, the exact results of our analysis may not be reproducible.  
118 Ulrich Schmoch, Concept of a Technology Classification for Country Comparisons, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 
(2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_ipc_technology.pdf 
119 Patents can be obtained in a contracting state of the EPO, such as Germany, in one of three ways: 1) through 
“national” filing directly at the country’s local patent office, 2) through “regional” filing directly at the EPO, 3) 
through “international” filing through a Patent Cooperation Treaty that has designated the EPO at the national phase. 
18 
 
patents, utility model patents), some of which are offered by the US and certain countries in 
Europe. 
D. Comparative Applications, Patents, and Renewals  
This article takes as its unit of analysis all US and EPO patent applications filed in 2002, 
the first full year for which US application data was available following the USPTO’s 
implementation of the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999.120 Approximately 120,076 
utility patent applications were filed at the EPO with a priority date of 2002.121 The USPTO 
received more than double that number, 273,619.122 By 2015, the USPTO had granted about 74% 
of these applications and the EPO had granted about 50% of these applications123 with about 6% 
of applications still pending.124 This translates into about 203K US patents and 57.6K EPO 
patents from filing year 2002.125 At the time of this writing, not enough time had passed to know 
the number of patents in force at the end of the eligible patent term of 20 years. However, the 
USPTO and EPO calculate that 37% and 12% of US and EPO patents, respectively, filed in 2002 
will remain in force 20 years after filing,126 so we use the numbers in our estimate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Unless otherwise indicated, the EPO statistics presented in this chapter represent EPO applications and grants, 
received through both “regional” and “international” routes. While the percentage of patents pursued through 
national filings is small, it varies by country. For example, in the years 2006 and 2012, the EPO received about 70% 
of all applications for Germany and 90% of all applications for the UK. 
(In 2006 and 2013 the EPO received 137,408 and 148,494 patent applications, respectfully. Source: 
http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2006.html, 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition.html), Germany received 60,585, 61,356 direct 
national applications (source: 
http://www.dpma.de/docs/service/veroeffentlichungen/jahresberichte_en/dpma_jb_2006_engl.pdf, 
http://www.dpma.de/docs/service/veroeffentlichungen/jahresberichte_en/dpma_annualreport2013.pdf), and the UK 
received 17,488, and 17,500, direct nationally applications (source: https://www.ipo.gov.uk/about-review2006.pdf, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246753/0214.pdf), respectfully. 
120 Described in Graham and Hegde, supra note ___.  
121 Excluding int’l PCT applications, based on PATSTAT 2015, cf 
http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/TSR.pdf, Table 2.1. (reporting, in 2002, 106, 243 total Euro-Direct and 
Euro-PCT regional phase patent applications and 165,066 total Euro-Direct and Euro-PCT international phase 
applications, and calculated based on filing date, rather than priority date).  (source: 9/24 correspondence with 
academic advisor to the EPO). 
122 Excluding PCT applications, based on PATSTAT 2015, cf The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two 
Centuries of Innovation, Office of Chief Economist at the USPTO (2015) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616724,  
and annual data file available at http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/historical-
patent-data-files (reporting, in 2002, 289,762 US patent applications, excluding PCT internationally filed 
applications) (a number that includes unpublished and continuation applications). Cf also 
http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/TSR.pdf, Table 2.3. (reporting 334,445 applications from 2002, including 
about 40,000 PCT applications (source: 9/8/15 correspondence with the PTO))  
123 Using the “Granted” status field in PATSTAT for the 2002 patents available in that database.  
124 Explained in Part I, supra. 
125 These ratios are roughly in line, for example, with grants in 2013, which totaled 277.8K and 66.7K (numbers 
include PCT filed applications).  
126Trilateral Statistics, Trilateral Statistics Report 2012, available at 
http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/annex.pdf, (Maintenance of Patents Granted by the Trilateral offices 
Table). Cf 2013 renewal projections of 40% and 20% in the US and EPO, respectively, for patents filed in 2013 
(http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition.html (Statistical Tables)). 
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FIG __ Projected Patents in Force based on Patent Applications filed at the USPTO and EPO in 
2002 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: PATSTAT 2015 (application and grant numbers), Trilateral Statistics 2002 Report 
(renewal rates). *patents originally issued by the EPO and validated in at least one member state. 
The data shows that at every stage in the patent lifecycle, the US system tilts towards a 
higher quantity patent system than does the EPO. In 2002, the USPTO saw more than double the 
applications that the EPO saw and granted 50% more of its applications than did the EPO, 
resulting in about three to four times more issued patents. Holders of US patents were projected 
to be three times more likely to leave their patents in force for 20 years after filings than were 
holders of EPO patents validated in member states. Collectively, this translates into a situation 
where 20 years after filing about 75K US patents will remain in force, while less than a tenth of 
that quantity of EPO patents— 6.9K — are expected to be in force somewhere in an EPO 
member state,127 a striking difference.  
We observed strong technology effects. The most dramatic gaps between EPO and US 
performance appear among applications that belong to the “electrical engineering” category, a 
field that includes computer technology, digital communication, telecommunications, and related 
fields.128 Three times as many applications were filed in 2002, and five times as many 
technology patents were issued on these applications by the USPTO than by the EPO, resulting 
in a seventeen-fold difference in the number of patents in force by year 20 after filing.129 In 
contrast, less than two times as many chemical and pharmaceutical patents were filed in the US 
                                                            
127 As noted before, the EPO’s numbers exclude national patent applications filed directly within a country, and 
patent holders may chose not to validate their EPO patents within those countries, so the number of patents within 
an individual European country will vary from this total.  
128 Schmoch, supra note __, at Table 2 
129 The USPTO and EPO received 99,764 and 32,861 non-PCT electrical engineering patent applications, and issued 
75,557 and 13,464 patents on these applications, respectively. Assuming a 37% and 12% Year 20 in-force rate 
(http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/annex.pdf (Maintenance of Patents Granted by the Trilateral offices 
Table), this would result in 27,956 and 1,615 US and EPO electrical engineering patents, respectively, a ratio of 
approximately 17 to 1. 
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than the EPO, and fewer than three times as many patents were issued in the US than were issued 
in the EPO. 130 Although there have been many demands to reform software patents,131 it is 
worth noting that just applying European grant and renewal rates or even US chemical 
application rates to US applications would reduce, dramatically, the number of technology 
patents in force.  
The overall view reveals the relative contribution of applicant and examiner decisions 
regarding the quality and quantity of patents in force. Although the US grant rate is about 50% 
higher than the EPO grant rate, even greater gaps exist between the two jurisdictions in the 
number of applications filed and the number of patents maintained. A number of variables 
determine the application rate, including patent doctrine, industry norms and uses for patents that 
do not require exclusivity (e.g. signaling). In addition, while relatively less attention has been 
paid to post-grant, as opposed to pre-grant, quality control mechanisms, the potential gains from 
a shorter patent life are just as considerable as the gains from increased quality.  
Over time, the numbers in this snapshot have changed, though in different directions. The 
gap in applications has increased, with the USPTO receiving close to four times as many patent 
applications as the EPO did in 2014, the last year for which complete data is available.132 
Reported application allowance rates in the US and the EPO have also fluctuated from 2002 
through 2013, however, the 20-30% difference in grant between the two jurisdictions has stayed 
constant.133 Finally, the gap in renewal rates has narrowed a bit, from patents being three times 
as likely to remain in force in the US to two times as likely to remain in force by the end of year 
20.134  With this baseline established, we now proceed to explore the determinants of quality at 
each stage in a patent’s life. 
II. Quality (and Quantity) Levers at the Patent Application Stage   
The quality and quantity of patent applications submitted to the USPTO is a function of a 
number of factors including levels of R&D, the pace of innovation, industry norms, and the letter 
and administration of patent law. While it has been widely noted that the US experienced growth 
in patent applications with the expansion of patentable subject matter and strengthening of US 
patents by the Federal Circuit in the 1990s, quantifying the contribution of this and other factors, 
like fluctuations in innovation or R&D, industry dynamics, and technology trends has remained 
elusive. A comparative view helps control for these factors, and disaggregates legal, technology, 
applicant, and other effects on patent quality.  
                                                            
130 The USPTO and EPO received 51,662 and 30,295 non-PCT “chemical” patent applications, and issued 34,192 
and 14,452 patents on these applications, respectively, a ratio of approximately 2.4 to 1. 
131 Described, e.g. in Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012)  (describing 
proposals including a five-year software patent term for mitigating the harms associated with software patents); see 
also, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1139 (1990) (describing opposition to software 
patents by many mathematicians, computer scientists, and others in the software development community.) 
132 FIVEIPOFFICES, IP5 Statistics Report 2014: Chapter 4 Patent Activity at the IP5 Offices, 49 (available at 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/chapter4.pdf). 
133 Quillen & Cotropia, supra note ____, at Figure 9. 
134 Id. at 57 and accompanying Table (showing maintenance rates of 40% and 20% by year 20 in the US and EPO, 
respectfully) 
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A. The Differences in Application Rates (Including Over Time) and What 
Explains Them 
1. Technology Effects - The Software Patent Problem 
As noted earlier, the USPTO now gets four times more patent applications as the EPO, 
which has nearly double the covered population. However, this snapshot of patenting behavior 
and outcomes doesn’t reveal when and how the relative increase in demand for US patents was 
experienced. Looking more closely, at patent grants by year (since US applications are not 
available prior to 2001), we can see that a surge in technology patents in particular has grown the 
gap.135 (FIG.____) From 1996 to 2008, in the US, the percentage of “electrical engineering” 
patents, which includes computer technology, digital communication, telecommunications, and 
related fields,136 nearly doubled, from 24% to 46%137 of all patents by the USPTO issued 
annually. During this time, shares of electrical engineering patents at the JPO and EPO grew, but 
much more modestly, about 25%.138 Driven by legal, technological, and industry developments 
the increase in filings strained patent examination resources in the US. As the Patent Office 
attempted to cope with the backlog, there was a decline and then an increase in patent grant 
rate.139 
 
  
                                                            
135 As to the EPO patents, it should be noted that patents in Europe may be sought outside of the EPO, however the 
proportion of non-EPO European patent applications is generally small, around 10-30%. See discussion in Part I, 
supra. 
136 Id. at Table 2. 
137 Accord USPTO Chief Economist Office, supra note ___ at Figure 9 (showing disproportionate growth in US 
electrical and electronics and computers and communication patent applications from 1995 to 2015). 
138 In the EPO and JPO the share of electrical engineering patent grants grew from 24% to 29% and 28% to 35% of 
patents, respectfully, based on analysis of PATSTAT data. This time period was chosen because of the availability 
of Japanese data, which is hard to obtain reliably by class IPC prior to 1996 and after 2008. Author’s own analysis. 
Accord Trilateral Patent Offices Report (2012), supra note __ (reporting, by 2011, that 29% of EPO patent 
applications, vs. 49% of USPTO applications, and 35% of JPO application were electrical engineering patents. 
Earlier year views by these categories are not available.)  
139 Dennis Crouch, USPTO Allowance Rate, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/08/uspto-allowance-rate.html (depicting and describing, regarding the PTO 
allowance rate, the “Dudas-Drop in the second-half of the last decade and the subsequent Kappos-Climb”). 
23 
 
FIG. ___: EPO and US Patent Grants by Industry, 1986 to 2011 
 
 
Source: PATSTAT 2015, author's analysis. Technology sector data provided by WIPO in 
accordance with Schmoch (2008)140 [File: combined surge data 2] 
We are hardly the only ones to notice the prominent role that software and business 
method patents, and disputes about them, have played in the US patent system. The share of 
overall patents covering software, which spans several technological categories, grew from 20% 
of patents in 1991 to more than half of all issued patents in 2011,141 and software-related patents 
were associated with nearly 90% of the increase in defendants to patent litigations initiated from 
2007 through 2011,142 a period also associated with an increasing share of assertions brought by 
patent assertion entities.143 Non-practicing entities disproportionately litigate software patents, 
based on judicial decisions.144 Software patents have overwhelmingly lost when put to the test in 
litigation, but only after they have been asserted multiple times.145  
2. Legal Effects and Approaches to Software 
                                                            
140 Schmoch, supra note ___. The “Electrical Engineering” category includes Computer Technology, Basic 
Communication Processes, IT Methods For Management, Semiconductors, Electrical Machinery, Audio-Visual 
Technology, Telecommunications, Digital Communication. 
141 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help 
Improve Patent Quality (2013), at 13; available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/GAO-12-465_Final_Report_on_Patent_Litigation.pdf; 
accord Colleen V. Chien, Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 90 SOUTHERN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), at FIG. 1.  
142 Id., Gov’t Accountability. 
143 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, (June 2013) (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.  
144 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David Schwartz, How Often Do PAEs Win Patent Suits?, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. *3-4 (forthcoming 2016). 
145 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 695–96 (2011). See also Shawn P. Miller, What’s the Connection Between Repeat 
Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 316 
(2013) (concurring that software and NPE-owned patents lose more). 
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Although software has not always been broadly patentable, the Federal Circuit’s State 
Street decision in 1998 ruled that inventions that produced “a useful, concrete and tangible 
result" could be patented.146 For three decades, the Supreme Court did not find any patent barred 
on subject matter restrictions, although inventions could still be ineligible on other grounds. The 
little known Federal Circuit case In re Vaeck,147 in combination with the USPTO practice, made 
it harder to reject inventions as obvious. The case held that an invention would not be considered 
obvious unless there was a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art to combine old 
elements to make the invention.148 Taking the three-judge panel’s decision literally, the USPTO 
instituted a practice of requiring Examiners to complete the difficult task of search for writings 
that in a sense, reflected the obvious, in order to reject patents.149  In 2006, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in the eBay case noted that "burgeoning number" of business-method patents were 
of "potential vagueness and suspect validity."150  
The EPO’s approach was, and continues to be, different. According to Chapter 52 of the 
European Patent Convention, only inventions with a technical character are eligible for patents, 
and methods of doing business and computer programs “as such” are explicitly excluded.151 
However software inventions that nonetheless represent an “inventive step,” towards solving a 
technical problem are patentable.152 
In 2013, 25 years after the Federal Circuit’s State Street decision, the Supreme Court 
broke with its pattern of not rejecting patents on eligibility ground. Denying a patent application 
over a method of hedging risk in energy commodities trading, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme 
Court rejected a single test for patentability153 and the State Street test.154 In Alice v. CLS Bank, 
the Court decided that merely implementing an abstract idea on a computer did not make it 
patentable. These cases, along with a few others on the patentability of subject matter, have 
called into question scores of already issued as well as pending patents, not only on software but 
                                                            
146 State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
147 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
148 Id. (“To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some 
suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of 
ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a 
reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or 
suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable 
expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, not in applicant’s disclosure”). 
149 Jake Ward, The Evolution of MPEP 2143 – Prima Facie Case of Obviousness, PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAW 
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2008), https://anticipatethis.wordpress.com/2008/02/23/the-evolution-of-mpep-2143-prima-facie-
case-of-obviousness/ (showing that pre-KSR MPEP guidance to Examiners reflected the Veack standard). 
150 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006). 
151 The European Patent Convention, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/epc/2013/e/ar52.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
152 European Commission Press Release, Proposal For A Directive On The Patentability Of Computer-Implemented 
Inventions - Frequently Asked Questions, Reference: MEMO/02/32, Brussels, Feb. 20 2002, europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-02-32_en.pdf (describing the standard for patentability applied by the EPO to software patents and 
noting that, by 2002, at least 30,000 patents for computer-implemented inventions had been issued by the EPO). 
153 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010). 
154 Id. at 601. 
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diagnostic methods155 and DNA. The check imaging patent described at the outset of this article, 
as well as patents over recognizing different data formats156 and using digital signatures to 
identify spam email,157 have been deemed ineligible.  
The courts have elevated other patent-quality standards as they apply to software. In June 
2013, the White House and USPTO announced an initiative to apply greater scrutiny to 
functional claiming, the practice common in software patents of drafting claims in order to 
capture broad, and many would argue unwarranted, scope in enforcement.158 However, the 
PTO’s job is to apply the law, and few court decisions had addressed the sort of scrutiny that is 
warranted. The Federal Circuit’s Williamson en banc decision159 in 2015 addressed this void. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus did away with the incredibly low bar set by 
the Federal Circuit that only “insolubly ambiguous” patents are too vague to warrant 
protection.160 The Court’s earlier decision in KSR v. Teleflex, part of the same stretch of 
decisions that made the Federal Circuit the most overturned circuit court in the United States,161 
did away with the rigid rule that a finding of obviousness requires a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation, and enabled examiners to rely more on common sense.162 
The long-term impact on patent quality of recent case law shifts will depend on how 
these cases influence the behavior of applicants and the PTO.  Already they have had a 
significant impact on the existing stock of challenged patents163 and, all other things being equal, 
fewer inventions should be patent eligible and fewer applications received by the USPTO. Some 
commentators believe that the US patent system’s patent quality woes began with the formation 
of the Federal Circuit as well as the State Street decision.164 But whether they end with the 
current slate of decisions will depend on the robustness of other non-doctrinal dynamics, 
discussed next. 
3. Industry Effects – Defensive, Strategic, and Portfolio Patenting  
                                                            
155 See, e.g., Exergen Corp. v. Thermomedics, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D. Mass. 2015) (invalidating a patent on a 
forehead thermometer based on the insight that forehead measurements are reliable); Kevin Noonan, Patent Watch: 
Diagnostic Patents at Risk after Federal Circuit Decisions, NATURE: NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY (May 20, 
2016), http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v15/n6/full/nrd.2016.105.html (describing cases of diagnostic tools being 
deemed ineligible for patent protection). 
156 Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
157 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D. Del. 2015). 
158 Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013).  
159 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en banc), superseding 770 F.3d 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) 
160 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014). 
161 Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE (Jan./Feb. 
2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheckdam.
pdf (documenting an 83% reversal rate for the Federal Circuit from 1999-2008, the highest among all circuits, and a 
92.3% reversal rate in patent cases). 
162 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
163 Robert R. Sachs, #Alicestorm: July is Smoking Hot, Hot, Hot…And Versata is Not, Not, Not, BILSKI BLOG (Jul. 
14, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/07/alicestorm-july-is-hot-hot-hotand-versata-is-not-not-not.html 
(reporting an invalidation rate of ~70% of patents challenged on patentable subject matter grounds in the first 13 
months following the Alice Corp v. CLS Bank decision). 
164 See, e.g. Bessen & Meurer, supra note ___, at ____. 
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The quality of issued patents depends on the quality of applications submitted to the 
patent office. But a number of factors independent of patent law have put upward pressure on the 
number of patents filed, and a corresponding downward pressure on the amount of time and 
money each applicant puts into each individual patent. Unpacking these motives reveals that the 
demand for patents will remain even as the courts remove some of the scope of patentable 
subject matter, reducing the chance that dramatic changes to the law will alone translate into 
dramatic changes in the number of application filings. 
In technology areas characterized by cumulative innovation, for example, the purpose of 
patents has become largely strategic: entities seek patents in order to have something to trade 
with others and thereby achieve freedom to innovate, rather than to exclude others from the 
technology.  The pursuit of patents over incremental improvements in order to build defensive 
arsenals, a dynamic that was spurred by the licensing campaigns of IBM and Texas Instruments 
in the late 1990s in software and technology industries, has been well documented.165 
“Defensive” patenting is now pervasive in many industries besides computers.166 The embrace of 
strategic or portfolio167 patenting has also placed a greater emphasis on the quantity of the whole 
rather than the quality of the individual parts within a set of patents.  
In a number of surveys, half or more of patentees say they pursue patents for defensive 
reasons,168 and we believe that the proportion of patents pursued primarily for those reasons is at 
least as high. When Google acquired Motorola and its 25,000 patents in 2011, CEO Larry Page 
said that it did for defensive reasons— in order “to better protect [its operating system] Android 
from anti-competitive threats from Microsoft, Apple and other companies.”169 Among the top 50 
owners of patents,170 many if not most of them are “high-tech” companies that depend on 
freedom of action in order to keep up with the rapid pace of competition. Over 2,000 companies, 
including five out of the top ten have taken steps to commit some or all of their patents to 
defensive uses.171 
                                                            
165 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of 
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001) (examining the propensity 
of semiconductor firms to obtain patents despite their ineffectiveness in appropriating returns to research and 
development (“R&D”)); James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007). (providing empirical accounts of the apparent “arms race” in the semiconductor and 
software industries); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 26–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (documenting the prevalence of defensive motives in patenting); Chien, 
Arms Race supra note  ____at ___ (same). 
166 See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, 44-45 (2014) (documenting the prevalence of defensive patenting in biopharma industries). 
167 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
168 See Chien, Exclusionary and Diffusionary, supra note ___ at Part II.A. for an overview of surveys. 
169 Larry Page, Supercharging Android: Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 15, 
2011), available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/supercharging-android-google-to-acquire.html. 
170 IFI CLAIMS Patent Services, IFI CLAIMS 2014 Top 50 US Patent Assignees (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.ificlaims.com/index.php?page=misc_top_50_2014 (last visited ____). 
171 The OIN Community, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/community-of-
licensees/ (listing over 2,050 companies as within the Open Invention Network community as licensees, members, 
or affiliate members, that commit themselves to the OIN patent non-aggression pledge) (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
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Comparing national R&D and national patenting trends also provides information about 
the amount of investment reflected in each individual patent. As described earlier, the vast 
majority of companies doing R&D do not file for patents making the match between R&D and 
patents inexact at best.172 However, based on our independent calculation using available data, 
and building on work done by Hunt and Bessen,173 we observe that the rise in the number of 
technology patents over the past few decades has been accompanied by a diminishing amount of 
R&D per patent,174 consistent with the evolving industry dynamic discussed above, and likely 
due to other factors as well. Using R&D figures provided by the National Science Foundation by 
SIC/NAICS category, and the numbers of patents applied for by US entities during the same 
period within these categories,175 we calculated the ratio between R&D and patents from 1980 to 
2008. At its peak, in 1983, $5M of national R&D was spent per electrical equipment and 
computing patent. By 2007, according to the same methodology, this number had declined to 
about a fifth of that, $1.04M of national R&D per patent in inflation-adjusted dollars.176 (FIG 
___) In contrast, chemicals patents have reflected a declining, but then rising R&D per patent 
ratio.177  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
For further discussion of the OIN pledge and others, see Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 
(2015). 
172 Brandon Shackelford, One in Five U.S. Businesses with R&D Applied for a U.S. Patent in 2008, NA’L SCIENCE 
FOUNDATION (Feb. 2013), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13307/. 
173 Bessen & Hunt, supra note ___ at ___. 
174 In order to correlate R&D and patenting activity, we drew from two sets of data. For R&D data, we relied on the 
National Science Foundation's Survey of Industrial Research and Development, the "the primary source of 
information on research and development performed or funded by businesses within the United States." The annual 
survey, conducted by the Census Bureau examines a nationally representative sample of companies in 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries, and establishes total US R&D expenditures, by the government and 
private companies. (http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry/) The survey reports on total manufacturing and non-
manufacturing R&D by SIC code, up to 1998, and NAICS code in 1999 and after. We took several steps to 
compensate for deficiencies in the data. First, at the individual line item level (encompassing one or more SIC 
codes), data over the time series was at times missing or suppressed for confidentiality reasons. To reduce 
distortions that could be caused by missing data, we selected for analysis the two subcategories - Chemicals and 
Computer and Electronic products - where few data points were missing: 8 out of 68. We approximated these 8 
missing values by applying a simple averaging or ratio functions based on available data, consistent with other 
researchers (correspondence with the NSF). The transition from SIC- to NAICS-based reporting created a 
discontinuity in the data in 1999. Although the SIC and NAICS categories that represent Chemicals and 
Computer/Electronic Products are similar, they are not a perfect match. To compensate, we applied a smoothing 
function to enable a time series view, performing checks on the individual time series before doing so. For patent 
counts, we relied on the USPTO's databases of patent and patent applications, and relied upon their primary IPC 
number to associate them, using the "Algorithmic Links with Probabilities" (ALP) concordance devised by Lybbert 
and Zolas, (described at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/econ_stat/en/economics/pdf/wp5.pdf) to specific SIC 
and NAICS categories of interest. The match from patents to industrial categories was inexact as, for example, 
patents were at times assigned to multiple IPCs, which were in turn associated with particular SIC or NAICs codes.  
We used the first IPC class to assign each patents to an industrial class, making each patent count potentially both 
under and over inclusive. 
175 Application data was not available for the entire period. 
176 Based on applying a smoothing function to compensate in a change from SIC to NAICS-based reporting in 1999. 
177 See also Helene Dernis & Mosahid Khan, Triadic Patent Families Methodology Fig. 12 (OECD, STI Working 
Paper 2004/2, 2004) (reporting relatively constant ratios of triadic patent families to industry-financed R&D from 
1985 to 1999, based on residence of the inventor). 
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 Source: Author analysis based on NSF, USPTO. Source File: 1975-2007 Dataset CC 
 
Other studies, using different methodologies and timeframes, have shown mixed results 
regarding the overall ratio between R&D and patents.178 However, the two studies we found 
which disaggregate patent per R&D by technology category report findings consistent with ours. 
Kim and Marschke find that until 1983 patents per R&D in the computer industry declined but 
from 1983–2000 it increased.179 The authors also find that patents per R&D decreased for the 
pharmaceutical industry through 2000. Hicks and her coauthors found that patents per million 
dollars in R&D doubled in the information technology category between 1989 and 1998, but that 
patents per R&D was stable for chemical and other technology categories.180  
The downward trend in R&D per tech patent is consistent with the perception that over 
the past few decades more technology patent applications, each covering less, have been filed. 
Empirical work, generally surveys, have also led to a better understanding of the other reasons 
                                                            
178 Cf. Daniel Wilson, Are We Running out of New Ideas? A Look at Patents and R&D, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. 
(Sept. 12, 2003) available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2003/september/are-we-running-out-of-new-ideas-a-look-at-patents-and-research-and-development/, 2011 
World Intellectual Property Indicators, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 8 (2011), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2011.pdf (finding that US R&D 
expenditures have increased faster than US patenting has over the periods 1953 to 1999 and 1995-2010, 
respectively), and Samuel Kortum, Equilibrium R&D and the Patent–R&D Ratio: U.S. Evidence, 83 AM. ECON. 
REV. 450, ___ (1993) (finding that the ratio of patents to R&D fell 1975 and 1989).  
179 Jinyoung Kim & Gerald Marschke, Accounting For the Recent Surge In U.S. Patenting: Changes in R&D 
Expenditures, Patent Yields, and the High Tech Sector, 13 ECON. OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECH. 543 (2004). 
180 Diana Hicks et al., The Changing Composition Of Innovative Activity In The US—A Portrait Based On Patent 
Analysis, 30 RES. POL'Y 681 (2001). 
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companies file for patents, and the often non-exclusionary motives that motivate, at least in part, 
the decision to patent. For specialized innovators, like universities and technology specialists, for 
example, patents facilitate transfer of the technology to commercialization partners in support of 
“open innovation,” 181 given that patents are generally easier to transact in than trade secrets. 
Small companies and startups are motivated to file for patents in order to attract financing, in 
addition to reasons of exclusion and defense.182   
B. Application Patent Quality Levers 
1.Separating the Wheat from the Chaff at the Application Stage 
Certain patent mistakes are very expensive. Take the example of the ‘137 check imaging 
patent that was only invalidated after it had helped to generate licensing fees of $350M. None of 
the seven related applications at the EPO became a patent – 4 were refused outright by the EPO, 
and 3 were withdrawn.183 In an ideal world, more resources would be allocated to examining 
such applications, while less would be used to vet those that will never be enforced. On the same 
day the USPTO granted the ‘137 patent, it granted thousands of other patents. In the vast 
majority of cases, the patent were neither asserted in court nor used to pursue high-profile patent 
licensing campaigns.  A number of the patents likely served as the basis for a technology 
transaction, enhanced a company’s reputation for innovation, were used to recognize the 
contributions of an inventor, or just sat on the shelf. The odds are that many were so 
economically unimportant that they were left to lapse before their full 20-year term.184 How 
important is it to ensure the quality, for example, of a patent relied upon by a young company to 
secure a bank loan but which the company has no intention to enforce? Somewhat, two scenarios 
suggest. First, it is impossible for follow-on innovators to know that the intention of the patentee 
is to use the patent only in non-exclusionary ways, leading other to greater inefficiency as others 
unnecessarily “design-around” the patent. Second, even if the original owner of the patent 
disavows exclusionary motives, things can change, for example in the bankruptcy or sale of a 
company, or a shift in company strategy.185 Patent trolls often buy patents from defunct or still 
operating companies that themselves often aren’t in a position to assert the patents, due, for 
example, to the threat of retaliation, reputational costs, and a lack of alignment with the business. 
If a patent is broad, even if its validity is highly suspect, it can still be used as the basis of a 
licensing campaign or lawsuits.  
Still, given the diverse uses to which patents are applied, it is worthwhile to consider how 
we might distinguish between applications that, once they mature into patents, are likely to 
                                                            
181 Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in 
American Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20264, 2014). 
182 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009). 
183 Based on reviewing the “Legal Events” of each application at Google Patents. 
184 Patentholders abandon their patents before their full term in the majority of cases. See, e.g., Kimberly Moore, 
Worthless Patents (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 04-29, 2004); Dennis Crouch, Maintenance Fees 
2015, PATENTLY-O (Jul. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/maintenance-fees-2015.html (showing that 
less than 50% of patentees pay the third renewal fee). 
185 See Chien, Arms Race, supra note __ (describing the phenomenon of “once defensive” patents turning offensive). 
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matter, from the rest, and to allocate examination resources accordingly. One option would be to 
create two tiers of patent applications – one that receives little or no examination, and one that 
receives heightened examination. The move to a patent registration system in 1793 that Jefferson 
carried out,186 effected half of this transition, and both Germany and China allow inventors to 
apply for “petty patents,” that are registered with little examination, alongside regular, utility 
patents.187 In a similar vein, Lemley and his co-authors have proposed allowing patentees to 
designate the applications they think matter and elect more rigorous examination for them. The 
applications that withstand the higher level of scrutiny would be considered “gold-plated” and 
would therefore receive a heightened presumption of validity.188 This proposal has often been 
coupled with the idea that, regarding the other, less significant, patents, examiners are justified in 
remaining “rationally ignorant,” because the patents don’t matter much.189 An alternative to 
allowing applicants to “upgrade” their patent before they issue through heightened reviews, is to 
allow third parties to “downgrade” or invalidate after they issue, through post-grant quality 
reviews.  
Differentially applying quality filters in these ways has problems, however. It is difficult 
for patentees to know ahead of time which patents are worth gold plating, as a patent’s value 
only emerges over time.190 The idea of relegating all remaining patents to limited review, 
because they don’t seem to matter, has been roundly criticized.191  
Post-grant challenges that take place after a patent has issued have the advantage of 
reflecting evolving market and technical conditions and information, however they are expensive 
and time-consuming, and because they are largely brought by third party challengers, in a sense, 
come “too late” – after the challenger has been accused in a patent case.  An ideal mechanism 
would combine the virtues of these two approaches and eliminate their vices – by enabling the 
identification and heightened scrutiny of patents that are likely to be enforced to come later in a 
patent’s life and be initiated by the patentee as well as third parties. We discuss one proposal for 
doing so, through the implementation of a “defensive only” patent, in Part IV. 
However, if designating only certain applications for heightened quality reviews when 
they are applied for isn’t possible, another alternative is to increase quality for all patents during 
the examination process, which we explore next. 
III. Patent Quality Levers At the Examination Stage 
Conversations about patent quality tend to devolve into discussions about patent office 
shortcomings. This part begins differently, by following the lead of Thomas Jefferson, one of 
                                                            
186 Described supra, at notes _____.  
187 Described, e.g., in PATENTS AROUND THE WORLD, Vol. 1-2, 2013. 
188 Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman & Bhaven N. Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents, 28 REG. 10 (2005) 
(recommending reducing the overall presumption of validity while strengthening it for certain patents that undergo 
more rigorous search and examination). 
189 Described in Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. (2001). 
190 Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011) (analysis showing that the ability to 
identify which patents will be enforced improves over time). 
191 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System – Design Choices 
and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2004).   
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America’s first patent examiners, in acknowledging that applying patent quality filters is both 
difficult and time consuming. As historian PJ Federico recounts, Jefferson was “quite favorable 
to the granting of patents, and granted them with great consideration, the other duties of 
members of this Board, in view of their high offices, made it impossible for them to devote much 
time to this work. As a result the law was changed in 1793 to make the granting of patents a 
clerical function.”192 This transition reflected the sense that if examination couldn’t be done 
properly, it shouldn’t be done at all. 
The case studies described at the beginning of this article highlight the challenges. Before 
the ‘137 check imaging patent described above was revoked by the Patent Office, it was upheld 
by the Patent Office,193 in a proceeding called reexamination, as well as by a Texas jury.194 The 
question of patent validity is not purely a technical determination but also a legal and evidentiary 
one. To examine a patent, as described in Chapter 2, requires interpreting and understanding the 
claims, applying external knowledge and references to an evolving legal standard, and arriving at 
a legal conclusion. To evaluate the application that eventually became the ‘704 podcasting 
patent, a patent examiner had to search for references that were more than a decade old. One of 
the references ultimately relied on to invalidate the patent, supplied by an outsider, not the 
USPTO or applicant, was an unpublished master’s thesis from MIT. 195 
While examiners in the USPTO and EPO carry out the tasks described above in very 
different ways, they apply largely the same standards. These are some differences in how the 
tests are articulated – for example, European examiners apply an “inventive step,” rather than 
“obviousness” filter and, unlike American examiners, use a “problem-solution” approach to 
determine whether or not a patent application meets the standard.196 For years, certain classes of 
prior art were not available in the US, due to the American grace period, but these differences, 
minor to start with, have narrowed in recent years.197 Trilateral studies of patent examination 
conducted by the PTO, EPO, and JPO198 have found that, despite the different articulation of 
legal standards in each jurisdiction, the application of them and the same technical references to 
the same application yields largely the same outcomes.  
                                                            
192 S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952),  available at http://digital-law-online.info/misc/SRep82-1979.pdf. 
193 File history of the ‘137 patent, supra Part I. Lisa Lerer, Senate, Old Legal Woes Drawn into Patent Fight, 
POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2008), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2008/03/senate-old-legal-woes-drawn-into-
patent-fight-009202. 
194 Described in Hammerand, supra note ___. 
195 PTAB Decision, supra note ____.  
196 See, e.g., Stephen Kunin & Philippe Signore, A Comparative Analysis of the Inventive Step Standard in the 
European and Japanese Patent Offices from a U.S. Perspective, IP LITIGATOR 15 (Jan./Feb. 2008). 
197 Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA. 27 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1023 (describing the redefined 
scope of prior art under the America Invents Act and closer, though not complete, alignment with global standards) 
198 See, e.g., USPTO, JPO, and EPO, Comparative Study on the Hypothetical/Real Cases: Inventive Step and 
Nonobviousness (Sept. 2008), availbable at  
https://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi/kokusai/kokusai3/pdf/sinsa_jitumu_3kyoku/sinpo_en01.pdf (reporting that, out of 
six cases independently reviewed the USPTO and EPO, the same result was reached in all of them); Melanie J. 
Howlett & Andrew F. Christie, An Analysis of the Approach of the European, Japanese and United States Patent 
Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences (ESTs), 34 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT 581 (2003) 
(finding that, “despite the varied approaches [of the three offices] the end result with respect to the success of the six 
claims was similar for all offices”). 
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What explains, then, the differences in outcomes between the two jurisdictions? In the 
following paragraphs, we document that there are differences, not only with respect to the grant 
rate, which is higher for the US, but also with respect to customer satisfaction and quality, which 
are higher for the EPO. We focus on two practices that contribute to the EPO’s favorable quality 
ratings. First, the EPO invests heavily in getting quality right – it allocates more examiners, more 
time, and more checks to ensuring that patentability decisions are accurate. The US examination 
process, in contrast, has a high tolerance for mistakes, because it allows applicants to refile their 
rejected applications, and in many cases, get these cases allowed. This practice, while it limits 
the negative consequences associated with any bad examiner decision, makes examiner 
inconsistency and mistakes tolerable, in turn, driving lower patent quality and satisfaction. 
Second, the EPO process has several notable safeguards for overcoming the tunnel vision that 
results from the ex parte nature of the examination process. It dedicates extensive time and 
resources to searching and accurately reflecting the state of the art, produces a higher citation to 
non-patent literature, and uses a team examination approach which reduces inconsistency and 
promotes the application of “common sense” perspectives. It is also slower, more expensive, and 
less likely to give applicants the patents they seek.  
1. The Differences in Grant Rates and What Explains Them 
Ours is not the first study to document the disparities in EPO and US grant rates. Jensen 
and his colleagues have done a series of studies looking at comparative outcomes.199 Analyzing a 
cohort of patent applications submitted to the Australian, European, and Japanese Patent Offices 
from 1990-1995 that matched as equivalents 9,618 US patents,200 they found that the Australian 
Patent Office granted almost all (86%) of these applications, while the JPO granted less than half 
of them (42.6%) and the EPO grant rate was between (74%) these two figures.201 Harhoff and 
Graham analyzed the EPO counterparts of a sample of 2,474 US patents litigated from 1963-
2003 and their non-litigated counterparts, and report comparable grant rates, between EPO grant 
rates of 68% (among counterparts to non-litigated US patents) and 80% (among counterparts 
litigated US patents), as compared to US patents (100% grant rate).202  
                                                            
199 Paul H. Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth Webster, Disharmony in International Patent Office Decisions, 
15 FED. CIR. B.J. 679 (2006); Webster et al., Characteristics of International Patent Application Outcomes, 95 
ECON. LETTERS 362, 368 (2007); Paul H. Jensen, Elizabeth Webster, and Alfons Palangkaraya, Misclassification 
between Patent Offices: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Patent Applications, 93 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 
1063, 1075 (2011); Elizabeth Webster, Alfons Palangkaraya, and Paul H. Jensen, Patent Examination Outcomes and 
the National Treatment Principle, 45 RAND J. OF ECON. 449, 469 (2014) (finding that local offices tend to favor 
local applicants). 
200 Paul H. Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth Webster, Application Pendency Times and Outcomes Across 
Four Patent Offices (Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series, No. wp2008n06, 2008). 
201 Figure 2. These estimates are slightly deflated, as 1.7-13% of applications were still pending at the time of the 
analysis. 
202 Graham and Harhoff, Separating Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the U.S. Benefit from Adopting a Patent Post-
Grant Review? (“Wheat from Chaff”), 43 RES. POLICY 1649, 1659 (2009). In other work by the same authors, they 
found that EPO equivalents of US litigated patent applications were more likely to be awarded EPO patent 
protection than were equivalents of unlitigated patents (Stuart J.H. Graham and Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post-Grant 
Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents (Center for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006)) 
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One limitation of both of these studies is that they are based on US patents, rather than 
applications, necessarily excluding applications that never matured into patents in the United 
States. It could be the case, for example, that while the EPO only grants a portion of United 
States patents, the inverse is also true – that the United States only grants a portion of EPO 
patents, reducing any perceived gap in allowance rates. Quillen and Cotropia have documented 
the relatively lower overall grant rate in the EPO, as compared to the US, using official data. But 
while their analysis, as well as the one that we report earlier in this article, of applications from 
both jurisdictions, addresses the mismatch caused by comparing applications to patents, it could 
still be the case that the applications submitted to the EPO are weaker than those submitted to the 
USPTO, downward biasing the EPO grant rate, relative to the US one. Another weakness of 
these studies, is that, due to their design, they did not observe time and technology effects.  
To address these limitations, we created a set of matched EPO – USPTO patent 
applications from the cohort year analyzed earlier, 2002. Patent rights are territorial, so an 
inventor seeking protection over the same invention in multiple jurisdictions must file multiple 
applications. If an applicant for a US patent also seeks protection in Europe, she will typically 
file the same application, with slight modifications,203 within a year to the European Patent 
Office or World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO). While there are numerous ways to 
associate EPO and US patent applications, in our analysis we applied the most conservative 
approach and matched US and EPO patent documents with identical priority claims.204 We 
included in our set all available EPO and US application pairs from 2002205 (N=99,221), and 
traced the fate of each application through the two jurisdictions. We focused first on whether or 
not the application had been “Granted,” a status designated in PATSTAT.206  
Based on the same set of applications, 77% were granted in the US, while only 52% were 
granted in the EPO. This difference was robust across all 5 sector categories – in each case, more 
US than EPO patents resulted. Among technology sectors, the differences were most pronounced 
for electrical engineering (or “technology”) patents (FIG __). While technology patent 
applications had a less than one in two chance of maturing into a patent in the EPO, it had a 
                                                            
203 Id. Wheat from Chaff, at ___. 
204Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, a claim of “priority” to the first application by the second application 
confers the important benefit that the second application is treated as if it were filed on the same day as the first 
application. Subsequent applications can claim priority to one or more applications, within the same or different 
jurisdictions, creating the possibility of multiple applications within a single patent “family.” A patent family, in 
turn, can be either “simple” or “extended” – the members of a simple family share at least one common priority or 
“parent,” while members of an extended family include documents linked directly or indirectly through common 
priority claims. Patent families may also be formed through “expert-review,” for example through priority 
information as well as the review of content by experts as performed by the Derwent World Patent Index. Id. at __; 
See also Martinez, supra note____, at 45. We obtained these matches, called “equivalents,” from PATSTAT which 
publishes such matches through the DOCDB database. 
205 That is, with a US filing date of September 2002. 
206 While the "granted" variable is viewed as very reliable by PATSTAT researchers, in two cases, it may not reflect 
the current status – first, because PATSTAT is not updated in real time, it does not always reflect the most recent 
months’ of grants. Second, where there is a subsequent revocation of a patent, the granted status does not reflect the 
change in status. These divergences should have limited if any impact on our reported results. 
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greater than three out of four chances to mature into a US patent.207 This translated into a 34% 
difference between EPO and US grant rates among electrical engineering patents. The difference 
was less pronounced, but still significant for the other classes of patents. Chemistry and 
mechanical engineering applications were 17%, and instruments applications, 29% more likely 
to be awarded in the US as compared to the EPO. (FIG __)  
The differences were remarkably robust. In every one of the 35 sector subcategories 
defined by WIPO, we found, the US was more likely to grant a patent than was the EPO.208 
However, it is possible that they are an artifact of the period of time tested, as the fluctuations in 
US grant rates over time has been well-documented. To rule out this possibility, we expanded 
our analysis to a sample that included EPO applications matched to US grants from the period 
from 1975-2014. We found the relatively lower EPO grant rate to persist over time, consistent 
with the findings of Quillen and Cotropia,209 and observed that the relative EPO grant rate, in 
fact, declined over the tested period, though we believe some of the decline is due to time effects. 
These results confirm and expand upon earlier results.210 
 
                                                            
207 Of the 2,784 applications classified as “electrical engineering,” 76%, or 2,105 became US patents, while 43%, or 
1,273 became EPO patents. 
208 We performed T-tests on each difference, finding p-values between 0 and 2.49341704573321E-32, allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the difference in grant rates were the result of chance. (ADD T-Test table to 
Appendix) 
209 Quillen and Cotropia, supra note ___, at Fig 9 (documenting a persistently lower EPO grant rate over the period 
of time 1996 to 2013).  
210 See, e.g. Webster et al. supra note ___, at ___; Harhoff and Graham, Wheat From Chaff, supra note  ___ (finding 
the EPO to grant a fraction of US patents in their samples), and Quillen and Cotropia, supra note ___ (documenting 
a lower EPO grant rate over time). Webster et al.also reported comparative grant rates by select international patent 
classifications. While they do not correspond with the industry sectors from WIPO that we considered, they also 
found relatively smaller differences in the treatment of mechanical and instruments patent applications and relatively 
larger differences in grant rates of hardware and communications applications. (FIG 3) 
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Source: Author’s analysis based on PATSTAT 2015, Smoch/WIPO, [File:  Slide 14 data]211  
The pervasiveness of the gap in grant rates across technology areas between the two 
jurisdictions is striking. What explains it? There are several possibility. One is that US patents 
are not strictly comparable to EPO patents because they are narrower in scope and claims. 
Because of the difficulty of testing this hypothesis we were not able to test it, and cannot rule it 
out as a major contributor. However, one might also assume that the difference is in the 
stringency of examiners at the EPO and USPTO, and based on the perspective that the US is 
issuing too many patents of low quality (rather than that the EPO is applying too high a standard 
to issue too few patents), that US examiners are too lenient. If this were the case, we would 
expect a lower rate of rejection in the USPTO than the EPO, a testable hypothesis.  
To probe whether or not applicants experienced fewer rejections at the PTO than EPO, 
consistent with the hypothesis of examiner leniency, we compared the outcomes of non-granted 
and granted cases, taking into account key differences among possible outcomes. The 
allowability of an application filed at the EPO is determined over a series of steps, culminating, 
if it proceeds all the way, in an Examiner’s decision to grant or refuse the application. Along the 
way the applicant may withdraw from the application process, affirmatively or passively, or the 
application may remain pending, leading to each application having one of four statuses: granted, 
withdrawn, refused, or still pending.212 The US process is similar in a number of ways, allowing 
applicants to “abandon” their cases by not responding to an office action or paying a patent issue 
fee, but it also differs in one important way – a US Patent examiner can never definitively refuse 
an application after examining it.213 This is because, in the US Patent office, unlike anywhere 
else in the world, applicants have the right to continue examination with the patent office despite 
a final rejection, by filing a request for continued examination (RCE), or, within a limited period 
of time, a continuation application. There are no limits to the number of times an applicant can 
refile the same application, and the negotiation can go on for years.214 As a result, patent 
applications filed at the USPTO only have three effective statuses: granted, withdrawn (or 
abandoned), or still pending.  
We looked at the legal status histories of EPO non-granted patent applications in our 
cohort to determine how they were resolved.215 But the results of our analysis (FIG ___) revealed 
a surprising result – when an application was not granted at the EPO, the reason was not that a 
case had been refused, but instead because it had been withdrawn. Among the 3,517 applications 
that were not granted in the EPO, 81% of ungranted cases were withdrawn by the applicant, 
                                                            
211 Accord, Webster et al., supra note ___at Fig.3. 
212 Described, e.g., in Id.  
213 Lemley & Moore, supra note ___, at 66. 
214 Although delays that are not attributed solely to the patent office count against the effective term of the patent 
215 For non-granted EPO applications, we relied upon the “Legal Status” filed in PATSTAT associated with each 
patent application in our September 2002 cohort.  
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while 13% were pending and 6% were refused. Of the US counterparts to these non-granted EPO 
applications, in contrast, the majority (64%) were granted, and the rest were abandoned.216  
 
2. Investing in Accuracy at the EPO v. Tolerating Error at the USPTO 
When one looks at the EPO examination process to explain the large share of withdrawn 
applications, a few features stand out. First, in the EPO, as in other jurisdictions,217 search and 
examination are separate, and examination only takes place if there is an affirmative request for 
examination. (FIG___) This results in a large percentage of applications being abandoned even 
before examination has taken place: as EPO President Battistelli has stated, “patents are granted 
in 49% of total filings, with 22% of applications abandoned after the search report and 29% 
abandoned after examination.”218 In our cohort, in which 81% of ungranted cases were 
withdrawn, that translates into 35% of cases withdrawn after search, and 46% after examination. 
(FIG ___) 
FIG ____: Examination Procedures at the EPO and the USPTO (adapted from IP5 2013 
Handbook) 
                                                            
216 Out of the 3,516 matched applications that were not granted in the EPO, 2,257 or 64% were granted in the US, 
the rest were abandoned, based on our hand-inspection of a sample comprising 295 file histories associated with 
these patents (yielding a 95% confidence rating / 5% confidence interval). [File “appln history G-Doc”] 
217 The Japanese, Korean and Chinese patent offices also share this feature. (FIVEIPOFFICES, IP5 Statistics Report 
2013, Fig. 4.9, available at http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition/ip5sr2013corr.pdf) 
218 EPO President Battistelli at the 30th Annual US Bar-EPO Liaison Council Meeting, 10/30/2014, transcript 
available at http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-
Europe/Committee%20Documents/Annual%20Meeting%202014/US%20Bar-
EPO%20Liaison%20Council/EPO%20Liaison%20Report%2010%2030%202014.docx). These figures include 
rejections, which are overwhelmingly provided during the examination, not search, phase of patent prosecution 
(Correspondence with the EPO on file with the author). 
13%
81%
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FIG ___The Resolution of Non‐Granted European
Patent Applications (N= 3,517)
Pending Withdrawn Refused
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But while the EPO process affords the applicant discretion during examination, this 
discretion in principal ends when the patent is refused. At this point, the applicant’s options are 
limited,219 as the EPO has decided the merits of the case, and reached a determination that the 
patent as filed does not meet its requirements. In contrast, in the US, even if the Examiner has 
reached a “final” decision about the application’s success or lack of success, the applicant has the 
right to effectively refile the application through a “request for continued examination,” or 
through a “continuation” application and have new claims issued and considered.  
The ability of applicants to extend examination has benefits for applicants who can use 
the additional time to determine whether or not their invention is commercial valuable, as well as 
to avoid the consequences of an inadequate examiner that rejects their claims. But the ability to 
extend examination indefinitely has also raised concerns because it enables applicants to draft 
patent claims to cover emerging developments in the marketplace, interfering with 
                                                            
219 The applicant can still do two things: file an appeal, which will be heard by the Boards of Appeal, or, if time 
limits permit, file a divisional application. The EPO does not have "continuation" or "continuation in part", 
applications and if a parent application is refused it is possible that the child application is also refused. Since the 
application is searched as a whole, and the content of the divisional cannot extend beyond the originally filed 
application (the parent), the chances of success are viewed as not great. (Correspondence with EPO official, 4/28/15) 
However, this apparently has not deterred the consistent use of divisional applications at the EPO in recent years 
even as the fees charged by the EPO have risen. See Dietmar Harhoff, Patent Quality and Examination in Europe 
106 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2016) (describing effects of recent administrative reforms at the EPO, resulting in claims 
numbers declining, claims sections in patents becoming shorter, and independent claims longer and presumably 
more specific, but continued use of divisional filings.)  
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competition.220 “Submarine” patents which are delayed in examination before being “launched” 
onto a mature industry have been a feature of the US patent since at least 1873, when the 
Woodbury planing-machine patent issued 24 years after it was filed, and subsequently used as 
the basis for mass litigation.221 
The inability of patent examiners to definitively dispense of patent applications has 
consequences for patent quality. It effectively incorporates a high tolerance for mistakes made by 
an examiner in her rejection of the application, as a continued filing or a refiling can overcome 
an examiner’s adverse “final rejection”. This, in combination with the high levels of 
inconsistency among Examiners documented by others,222 encourages patentees who at first do 
not succeed to try, and try again, in what has been described as an attempt to “wear down” the 
Examiner,223 or get another, “better” or more favorable one. This contributes to an overall 
dynamic in which the failure of the applicant and Examiner to get it right, in a sense, is viewed 
as routine and expected, and lacking in permanent consequence as to the eventual grant of the 
application.  
The same tolerance for error is not present in the EPO process. Instead, the EPO invests 
more upfront in ensuring that the prior art search report is comprehensive and that the 
substantive examination of the invention and application are technically correct. This greater 
investment translates into more people, more time, and more checks during the process.  
For example, in the EPO, an Examination Division of at least three examiners224 makes 
the decision to grant a patent.225 When an application advances to the examination phase, a first 
examiner, a second examiner, and a chairman are assigned to the case, “[f]or maximum 
objectivity.”226 Although the first examiner bears primary responsibility, she confers with her 
colleagues and the decision to grant or refuse a patent is issued by the entire Division.227 This 
panel approach reduces the risk of inconsistency, and the impact of an individual outlier 
examiner as decisions are the product of a group review.  Although the process of search at the 
EPO is carried out by a single examiner, the examiner is required to consult with other examiners 
if her search report is positive, to avoid improperly raising the expectations of the applicant.  In 
the US, an application is also assigned to an art unit, or group of examiners. However, the 
decision to allow the patent is the primary responsibility of a single Examiner, though a 
Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE) may weigh in.228  
The significant investment by the EPO into upfront patent examination is also reflected in 
the amount of time that examiners are allocated.  According to a study by van Pottelsberghe de la 
                                                            
220 Lemely & Moore, supra note ___, at ___. (criticizing  
221 Described, e.g. in CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW, 100 (2014). 
222 See studies by described supra in Part I. 
223 Lemley & Moore, supra note____.  
224 At times, a fourth, legal counselor, is added to the Division (correspondence with the EPO on file with the 
author) 
225 van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note __  
226 European Patent Office, The Patenting Process, available at http://www.epo.org/learning-
events/materials/inventors-handbook/protection/patents.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015) 
227 Chapter 18(2)(EPC) 
228 See Carley et al. supra note ___ (providing an overview of the examination process). 
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Potterie, former EPO Chief Economist, EPO Examiners on average get about 30 hours to 
examine a patent, vs. 19 at the PTO. 229 Much of the extra time is spent earlier, rather than later in 
prosecution, as further discussed below. 
3. Looking Beyond the Patent Office, at Non-Patent Literature  
Through this comparative analysis, we are not saying that the US should necessarily 
strive to reduce its grant rates to EPO levels or move overnight to separate examination from 
search, for example. The relatively greater investment of the EPO in quality comes at a cost – for 
example, while US examiners have less time to carry out search and examination tasks, their 
output is also higher than their counterparts – each US examiner examines an average of 1700 
claims per year, vs. 500 per EPO examiner.230 The fees associated with a US patent are lower, 
and in fact are the lowest in the world, when examination and maintenance fees are taken into 
account. (See FIG ___ ) While we save our discussion of the tradeoffs between cost and 
efficiency to later in this article, we discuss in this subsection the outcomes associated with the 
additional investment in quality, from the perspective of technical accuracy, social calculus, and 
applicant satisfaction.   
We return to the basic task of a patent examiner – to ensure that patents are granted to 
novel and nonobvious ideas. Although seemingly simple, finding the closest reference to an 
invention has long been recognized as challenging. For example, in 1967, a Presidential 
Commission opposed granting software patents for this reason, stating that “the Patent Office 
now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique 
and the requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be 
feasible or economic because of the tremendous amount of prior art being generated.”231 To 
carry out searches requires an examiner to be “a living encyclopedia of science… His 
multifarious duties require an intimate and thorough knowledge of the whole circle of science 
and art.”232 While the US Patent Commissioner in his Annual Review wrote these words in 1845, 
the challenges remain.  
It is no longer feasible, for example, if it ever were, for patent examiners to know the 
relevant art in all technology fields. This puts pressure on the classification of applications, 
which in turn determines the universe of prior art that is searched in the first instance. 
Compounding the problem, particularly within high-technology areas, is the prevalence of non-
standard ways of referring to technical object, and the diversity of relevant technology precursors 
to any particular invention. An examiner looking for prior references to “smartphones” may need 
to search the literature on pagers, telephony, mobile communication, and personal computers, for 
example. In contrast, there are only a limited number of ways to refer to a hydrogen molecule.233 
                                                            
229 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note __ at 4. 
230 van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note __ at 1778. 
231 Committee on the Judiciary of the United States, Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, 
Historical and Topic Legal Documents, at 21 (1967), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/9  
232 Described in Drahos, supra note __, at 149 note 27. 
233 Federal Trade Commission, the Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition (March 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307 
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Perhaps the most significant problem, however, is the large volume of innovation that 
happens outside of the patent system. The job of an examiner is to evaluate the invention before 
them in light of the current state of the art. While patents provide some indicia, the patent statute 
requires many other classes of references, including any written materials (digitized or not), 
sales, and prior uses of inventions, to be considered. Only one in five companies doing research 
and development files for patents,234 and in many industries technology is now openly 
disseminated in written yet non-standard form, whether through shared source code, standards or 
technical disclosures. There are ways for the patent office to access these outside perspectives, 
including through submissions by the applicant, who are required, as described in Chapter 2, to 
disclose all relevant references to the patent office.  However, the limited amount of time that US 
examiners have to conduct prior art searches, and the ex parte nature of the patent examination, 
as we have previously described, tend towards tunnel vision and the decision to grant, rather than 
deny, applications.  
A number of scholars have looked at the adequacy – or inadequacy – of references relied 
upon during examination. These studies have documented the heterogeneity in citation 
patterns,235 and compared references provided by the applicant to references found independently 
by the Examiner.236 However, to date there has been no systematic way to measure the quality of 
examination based on prior art, raising again the problem of measurement.  
An important indicia of the quality of examination is the extent to which non-patent 
references are cited by the examiner. Working scientists and engineers, whose knowledge is to 
serve as the yardstick for evaluating the technical merit of an invention, largely do not rely on 
patents to figure out whether or not something has been done before or how to do it.237 Neither 
should patent examiners, although patents may be the easiest source for them to access, since 
they are generated for examiners and with the input of examiners (on the claims). Studies have 
documented the greater prevalence of non-patent prior art references among certain, highly 
litigated patents, 238 as well as the greater propensity of applicants to submit non-patent 
references to the examiner for her consideration.239 However, just because a reference was 
submitted to the patent examiner does not mean that the reference was meaningfully considered 
in the course of examination. Indeed, Cotropia and his co-authors have documented the 
disproportionate reliance by examiners upon the references they find themselves, and on patent 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
patentreport.pdf. 
234 Brandon Shackelford, One in Five U.S. Businesses with R&D Applied for a U.S. Patent in 2008, NSF (February 
2013), available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13307/#tab1 
235 Juan Alcacer, Michelle Gittelman & Bhaven Sampat, Applicant and Examiner Citations to Patents: An 
Exploration and Overview, 38 RESEARCH POL’Y 415, 427 (2009) 
236 See, e.g. Christopher Cotropia, Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 
RESEARCH POL’Y 844, 854 (2013) 
237 See, Chien, Rethinking Patent Disclosure, __ VAND. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming) for a summary of the relevant 
literature on the use of patents as sources of technical information.  
238 John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U 
PA. L. REV. 1, 56 (2009) (finding most-litigated patents to cite ten times as many non-patent prior art references 
when compared to a controlled set). 
239 Cotropia, et al. supra ___, at 844-54 
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references, and the tendency of examiners to ignore art that is submitted by applicants.240 To put 
yourself in the eyes of someone in the field, the examiner’s basic job, requires one to read what 
those in the field are reading, and to understand the references that one in the field understands. 
An important indicator that the patent examiner is doing her job is the examiner’s citation of 
non-patent literature. 
The metric of examiner use of non-patent literature has several advantages. Unlike in 
other areas of patent law, it is generally undisputed that, “core to substantive quality is the prior 
art search.”241 The extent of US examiner citation of non-patent literature citation is also readily 
observable, due to a policy change in 2001 in the way in which patent citations are reported.242 
Perhaps most importantly, the USPTO itself has recognized the importance of “ways to get the 
best prior art in front of an examiner as soon as possible in the examination process,” making it a 
priority in its most recent patent quality initiative.243 The USPTO and the executive branch, 
during the Obama Administration, have also acknowledged the importance of incorporating 
outside perspectives and non-patent literature into the examination process through a number of 
initiatives.244  
To take stock of the extent of US and EPO examiner use of non-patent literature in the 
examination of patents, we returned to our matched sample of patents filed in September 2002. 
We applied slightly different methodologies to each analysis, due to differences in how EPO and 
US examination are carried out, and the ways in which examination records are constructed. In 
the US, examiner citation patterns are memorialized in two ways in US patent records. First, 
during the course of examination, the examiner lists the references that she relies upon in a prior 
art rejection or mentions as pertinent in a separate form.245 Each reference is designated as 
belonging to one of three categories: patent reference, foreign patent reference, and non-patent 
documents.246 Second, whenever a patent application or patent is published, the same references, 
“relied upon by Examiner” are memorialized through an asterix on the face of the publication, 
according to a practice that was introduced in 2001.247 Just as is the case with references cited by 
                                                            
240 Id. 
241 Vince Garlock, AIPLA Letter on Enhancement in the Quality of Patents and Merits (June 2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/comments/aipla23jun2010.pdf. 
242 See “Notice of References Cited,” PTO Form-892 and USPTO, Advance Notice of Change to “Reference Cited” 
on the Front Page of a Patent (2000), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2000/week52/patrefr.htm (describing that “when an examiner lists 
references on a Form PTO-892, the examiner lists references that are relied upon in a prior art rejection or 
mentioned as pertinent.”) 
243 Federal Register, Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality (Feb 5, 2015), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/chapters/2015/02/05/2015-02398/request-for-comments-on-enhancing-patent-
quality. 
244 USPTO, USPTO-led Executive Actions on High Tech Patent Issues, Executive Action 5: Crowdsourcing Prior 
Act, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/uspto-led-executive-actions-high-tech-patent-issues (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
245 See “Notice of References Cited,” PTO Form-892 and USPTO, Advance Notice of Change to “References Cited” 
on the Front Page of a Patent (2000), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2000/week52/patrefr.htm. 
246See “Notice of References Cited,” PTO Form-892, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/graphics/707_05a.png (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) 
247 See supra note __  
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the examiner during examination, references are designated as falling into one of three 
categories: “US Patent documents,” “Foreign Patent documents,” or “Other Publications.” The 
examiner is allowed, but not required, to draw from search reports provided by international 
searching authorities or references provided by applicants when they decide which references to 
rely upon. 
In the EPO, search and examination proceed separately (FIG___). During the search 
phase, the EPO examiner, in consultation with other examiners as described earlier, reviews the 
prior art. A report including the results of the search, as well as an initial opinion regarding 
patentability based on the search, is published by the EPO.248 In cases where EPO applications 
have been first filed internationally, and the EPO is designated as the search authority, 
preparation of the international search report fulfills the search phase, and the examiner that 
performs this search becomes part of the EPO team assigned to the application, should it advance 
through EPO examination.249 When the internationally filed patent application is subject to an 
earlier search carried out by another office, the EPO examiner may generate an additional, 
“supplementary search,”250 to complement the existing international search. The search report 
designates the ways in which the examiner is relying on the references through a series of codes, 
with the most common codes representing documents that establish the application’s lack of 
novelty (“X” document) or inventive step (“Y”).251  The references cited by the EPO examiner 
and in international search reports are accessible in the EPO at two different websites, 
“Espacenet” and “EP Register,” the latter of which also includes search results associated with 
EPO applications that have been filed internationally and searched by a non-EPO national office, 
and some applicant filed citations.252 Each cite identifies the source of the citation: international 
                                                            
248 Generally, EPO search reports are published as an Annex to the “A1” publication of the patent application 18 
months after the application was filed, an “A2” or“A3” publication of the application, or a “A4” supplementary 
search, described infra at note ___ . EPO “B” publications, which are granted patents, do not include search report 
results (US “B” publication do contain the citation history of the patent). European Patent Office, Basic Definitions, 
available at http://www.epo.org/searching/essentials/definitions.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2015), presentation by Kris 
Loveniers, EPO, “Search Matters 2014”  
249 Correspondence with EPO official on file with author. 
250 supra note __ 
251 Kris Loveniers, How to Interpret EPO Search Reports, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (2014), available at 
http://people.unica.it/liaisonoffice/files/2014/05/How-to-Interpret-EPO-Search-Reports.pdf 
252 The two databases vary in scope and purposes, but for the identification of examiner-cited prior art, have few 
differences except that the EP Register includes references generated by non-EP searching authorities in the case of 
EP patents first filed through the PCT (It also includes some additional references cited by the applicant, but we do 
not include such references in our analysis as they are not “examiner-cited.”). Espacenet is “a database of 
publications and documents, comprising patent publications from all around the world, including those from the 
EPO. Espacenet also includes other prior art documents such as non-patent literature, designs, utility models etc. 
Espacenet is, in short, a “prior art” database. The European Patent Register is a database of legal and procedural 
status data, only for patents processed by the EPO. It also contains access to the file wrapper associated with each 
patent dossier.” Correspondence with the EPO, Sept 3. References at both websites can be found in the “citations” 
tab of an application, however, the EP Register consolidates information from all publications into a single website, 
whereas Espacenet has different pages for each publication cf, e.g., for EP patent application EP2021283, with 
publications A1 and A4,  
 http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=EP&NR=2021283A1&KC=A1&FT=D, 
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=EP&NR=2021283A4&KC=A4&FT=D (separate 
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search report, EP search, or applicant search, and we included the first two categories as 
“Examiner-cited.”253 
We coded for the citation of non-patent literature in the two offices by consulting the 
sources mentioned, making a few adjustments to ensure an accurate comparison. With respect to 
US applications, in the majority of cases (N=5,542 out of 7,417), the patent had already been 
issued, and we consulted the front page asterix information of the published patent, as captured 
and made available by Google Patents,254 and performed spot checks  to ensure that this 
information was consistently reported. Where the application had not yet matured into a patent 
(N=1,875), we hand-inspected the patent’s file history posted to PAIR and looked at the 
references that had been cited by the Examiner, if any.255 In some cases, citation information was 
not publicly available due to secrecy requests by the applicant, or because the application was 
abandoned prior to publication or search and we excluded these applications from our analysis. 
We carried out a similar process with respect to European applications. First, we 
consulted the consolidated citation history of the EP Register for each patent. Next, to see if the 
results were significantly different based on studying Espacenet and Google Patents citation data, 
we coded 100 patents using all three methods. The Register and Google Patents contained 
substantially the same information,256 but we found Espacenet to periodically exclude references 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Espacenet links to publications A1 and A4 listing ) and 
https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP07748672&lng=en&tab=citations (single Register link). 
253 We made this decision based on consultation with EPO officials, who relayed to us that within the EPO, 
international search results are considered “examiner-cited” in the same way that EPO search results are, since 
generation of the international search satisfies the search phase of examination of the EP patent. The approach is 
different in the USPTO, as an international search or the references generated therein are only considered 
“examiner-cited” if they are actually cited by the examiner in a subsequent office action. This introduces a potential 
distortion in our results given the high percentage of EPO patent applications that are first filed internationally (see 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/af3a2fbb58589e51c1257def00465dc3/$FILE/epo_facts_and
_figures_2015_en.pdf, 13, estimating that the EPO receives 60,000 direct European filings, and 214,000 
international filings under the PCT). To investigate the impact of including international search results in our results, 
we coded ~500 EP applications for non-patent literature both including and excluding international searches. The 
difference was small: 41% of cases that included international search results cited NPL (188 out of 484 cases, with 
16 cases in which information was not available) while 43% of cases that excluded international search results cited 
NPL (148 out of 345 cases where non-international search results were available). (file: NPL III, EPO Sept 2002 
PCT Check) 
254 Which, in turn, pulls from the DOCDB database (author email). We compared front page asterix information and 
Google Patents asterix information and found a discrepancy rate of ~1%. 
255 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the rate of NPL citation was higher among patent application that did not mature into 
patents than among applications that did mature into patents. The NPL citation rate among non-issued US 
application was 25%, whereas the NPL citation rate among US applications that became grants was 12%. For EP 
cases, the NPL citation rates were 41% and 45%, respectively, among granted and non-granted apps. 
256 To access citation information for Google Patents, we consulted all versions of the application (A1, A2, A4, etc.). 
Also, international search reports within Google Patents citations data are often stored at a link included on the page 
of the application, whereas all of this information is consolidated within the EP Register record. (cf.e.g. Google 
Patents and EP Register information for EP applications with the publication numbers EP1266394 and EP1328947). 
In 36 out of the 100 cases, an international search report was part of the record, reflecting the high concentration of 
EPO cases generated through the PCT route but in 14 of these 36 cases, the examiner-cited NPL information was 
redundant of information already in the record. 
44 
 
included by the other two sources,257 and, at times, for there to be disagreements between the 
sources as to whether a source was Non-Patent Literature.258 We report the EP results based on 
the Register, as it represents the  most comprehensive source of data, but as before, when 
examiner citations data was unavailable, for example because an application was abandoned 
before search could be carried out, we excluded it from our results. We were left with 7,176 
USPTO and 7,255 EPO data points (out of the possible 7,417), in our analysis. We report our 
results in FIG ___.  
 
 
            
Source: Author Analysis based on USPTO PAIR, Google Patents, EP Register 
There were strong differences in citation patterns. Across the board, in every single 
category, the EPO was more likely to cite non-patent literature than the USPTO, in its 
examination of the same, non-withdrawn patent applications. While 44% of EPO applications 
included a reference to non-patent literature, only about 14% of US patents did. The gaps were 
most pronounced among mechanical engineering applications, where non-patent literature was 
nearly six times more likely to be relied upon an Examiner in the EPO case than by an examiner 
in the US case. Electrical engineering applications were four times as likely to be evaluated in 
view of non-patents by EPO examiners than by US examiners, while, among the major sectors, 
US and EPO examiners of chemistry patents were the most likely to cite non-patent literature. 
We also observed variations at the class level. For example, class 705 patents “business method” 
applications were almost twice as likely to receive examiner-based NPL citations as applications 
                                                            
257 Cf, e.g. Google, EP Register, and Espacenet information for EP applications with the publication numbers 
EP1298704, EP1294036, EP1080477 
258 See, e.g. characterizations of EP applications with the publication numbers EP1396745 and EP1428282. 
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in general.259 This could be an artifact of the PTO’s “second pair of eyes program” that put 
greater scrutiny on business method patents but also resulted in much lower grant rates.260  
4. Taking Time To Get it Right 
Why and how do EPO examiners rely so heavily on non-patent prior art? There are a 
number of reasons, beginning with the way in which examination is designed. Search is 
separated from examination and Examiners are instructed to, at the outset, carry out “thorough, 
high-quality, all-embracing search …[and] reduce to a minimum the possibility of failing to 
discover complete anticipations (sic) for any claims.”261 The intent of the search report is to 
support a decision by the applicant, “whether to continue prosecuting their applications and have 
them examined,” and overall, to “make it possible to determine, on the basis of the documents 
mentioned in the search report, whether and to what extent the invention is patentable,”262 in the 
words of the EPO board of appeals. Almost half of all withdrawn cases are withdrawn during the 
search phase before examination, as mentioned earlier.263  
The EPO also makes efforts to ensure that its examiners have access to the best prior art, 
including non-patent literature. The EPO’s “EPOQUE” search system, which contains more than 
a hundred databases, is viewed by many to be the best in the world.264 For example, it maintains 
a partnership with the IEEE and other standards setting bodies to collect non-patent 
specifications,265 and the USPTO has been urged to do the same.266  The Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, which supplies a large number of EPO applications,267 requires “mandatory search” of 
certain databases of non-patent references that the public can submit prior art to.268  
                                                            
259 17% (vs. 10%). Author’s analysis. 
260 Described, e.g. in Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office, 13 INNOV. POL. AND THE ECON. 83 (2013), at 87. 
261 EPO, Guidelines on Completeness of Search, at B-III, 2.1, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/b_iii_2_1.htm. (Complete description in context: “The European search is essentially a 
thorough, high-quality, all-embracing search. Nevertheless, it must be realized that in a search of this kind, 100% 
completeness cannot always be obtained, because of such factors as the inevitable imperfections of any information 
retrieval system and its implementation. The search should be carried out in such a manner as to reduce to a 
minimum the possibility of failing to discover complete anticipations for any claims, or other highly relevant prior 
art. For less relevant prior art, which often exists with a fair amount of redundancy amongst the documents in the 
search collection, a lower recall ratio can be accepted.”) 
262 Id. 
263 EPO President Battistelli, supra note____. 
264 Drahos, supra note ___, at 61-62. 
265 Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communication 
Technology, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 32 (2013) (describing collaborations between the EPO and a standards 
setting organization to include technical, non-patent documents in its search). 
266 Linda Kahl, Comments to the USPTO on Crowdsourcing (Apr. 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/comments/cr_f_kahl_20140418.pdf (recommending that the 
USPTO ensures that existing registries of biological parts are available to and searchable by USPTO examiners). 
267 European Patent Office, Facts and Figures 2015, 13, available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/af3a2fbb58589e51c1257def00465dc3/$FILE/epo_facts_and
_figures_2015_en.pdf ( estimating that the EPO receives 60,000 direct European filings, and 214,000 international 
filings under the PCT)) 
268 Research Disclosure Website, RESEARCH DISCLOSURE, http://www.researchdisclosure.com/ (last visited ____) 
(“Patent examiners are required to search Research Disclosure by PCT statute”). 
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But greater access to outside perspectives alone can't explain the EPO’s higher rate of 
non-patent literature citation. The US examination process actually arguably provides more 
access than does the EPO examination process to the relevant references that applicants know 
about, by requiring them to be provided to the examiner under the applicant’s duty of disclosure, 
described in Chapter 2.269 In fact, when there is a matching case before the EPO, the EPO search 
report normally will be submitted to the USPTO through this route. However, while applicant 
references generally include a high share of non-patent literature, they are infrequently used by 
US examiners, who overwhelmingly rely upon only the references they find themselves.270 This 
makes intuitive sense, particularly when the motivation for submission by applicants may be 
unclear,271 and presumably, applicants have reviewed the art that they have supplied and are 
submitting claims that steer clear of those references. However, it also means that USPTO 
examiners are not focusing or relying on the most relevant prior art – that which the applicant 
and other examiners know about. 
The simpler explanation is that US examiners are not allocated enough time to do their 
job, in particular to search for, review, and apply prior art, as others have noted.272 Searches for 
prior art, are reportedly performed, on average, in about two hours or less at the USPTO, as 
compared to eight hours at the EPO,273 and the average in 2015 is believed to be even higher, 
around twelve hours,274 although, in both jurisdictions, the amount of time allocated to search 
tasks depends on the technology.275 Finding and digesting new references applicable to the 
particular case takes time and reduces examiner output on a per hour basis. It is also required in 
order for examiners to fulfill their statutory mandate to grant patents only on novel and non-
obvious inventions. The substantially greater amount of time dedicated to search in the EPO, 
which leads to substantially higher rates of NPL citation, is consistent with the overall contrast 
we have drawn between the US and EPO, and the substantial, early investment of the EPO in 
examination. 
5.Quality v. Efficiency of Examination  
That a greater investment in search leads examiners to cite a more diverse set of 
references hardly surprises. But the different approaches that the USPTO and EPO apply have 
largely overlooked consequences for the quantity and quality of granted patents.  In the US, the 
upfront investment in quality by the Patent Office is relatively lower, in terms of examiner time, 
                                                            
269 In the EPO, examiners also have the ability to request information from applicants but doing so is not the norm. 
270 Cotropia et al. supra note at 844, 845 (Table 1) (showing that 94% of non-patent literature and 66% of patent 
literature cited by patents are applicant supplied) 
271 Lemley and Sampat, supra note __, describing the “flooding” or “burying” of patent examiners through applicant 
disclosure submissions, ____ . 
272 See, e.g. Michael Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing 
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data (NBER Working Paper No. 
w20337, 2014) (“Our results demonstrate that the less time an examiner is given to review an application the less 
prior art they cite, the less likely they are to make prior-art-based rejections (especially obviousness), and the more 
likely they are to grant the patent.”), Cotropia et al., supra note __ (discussing the time pressures faced by 
examiners) 
273 van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note __ at 1778 n.9. 
274 Correspondence with the EPO. 
275 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note __ at 4. 
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but the risks associated with examination mistakes or inconsistencies is also reduced through the 
ability of patent applicants to refile their application if they get outcomes they are dissatisfied 
with. Examination and grants come earlier and more often to US applicants, and at a lower cost.  
The EPO process has other strengths and weaknesses. The measured and staged nature of 
the EPO examination process invites applicants to evaluate at each phase of the process their 
options for pursuing the patent, and to develop a strong sense of the patent’s likely fate within 
the EPO. Cases that are not granted are withdrawn, often just based on the search, conveying the 
sense that even though applicants often do not get the patents they apply for at the PTO, they 
decide, at least in part, the fate of their applications.  This leads applicants to withdraw their 
applications to an extensive level, and to actually fail much more often in the pursuit of their 
patents – about 50% more, than in the US. The process is high-touch with a number of quality 
checks, supported by Examination teams who are careful not to raise expectations along the way, 
among applicants.  
From a social welfare perspective, the fewer unnecessary patents – patents that don’t 
disclose anything new or nonobvious, or that induce innovation – the better. But what about the 
private value of patent quality? Surprisingly, when asked, patent holders and companies have 
given the highest marks to the jurisdiction that is less likely to give them what they want (a 
granted patent), more slowly, and at a higher cost – the EPO. In surveys, the EPO has earned the 
highest marks of any patent office for the quality of the patents it issues, and also the highest 
levels of customer satisfaction. In a 2015 survey, for example, 62% of practicing lawyers and 
60% attorneys and corporate IP managers gave EPO-issued patents a rating of excellent or very 
good quality.276 The USPTO received ratings of 30% and 35% from the same populations.277 In 
the 2015 survey, the EPO also received the highest marks of all five “IP5” offices in terms of 
customer service.278  The strong support for the highly structured, quality-focused European 
model is striking. Though applicants don’t necessarily get the patents they seek at the EPO, or 
the unlimited freedom to continue having their patents examined, they remain in control of the 
process, receiving early warnings of an application’s likely fate.  
These findings imply that applicants favour European style examination, reflecting 
greater upfront investment and a more circumscribed patent examination process. In 2006, the 
USPTO moved to implement the latter when it proposed curtailing the use of “continuation” 
applications and requests for continued examination,279 in order to address existing backlogs. 
Patent lawyers and biopharmaceutical companies who file early in their product’s lifecycle, and 
use the continuation process to refine their applications based on marketplace developments 
strenuously resisted this initiative.280 While this sort of strategic game playing281 is detrimental to 
                                                            
276 Intellectual Asset Management, Quality and Procurement (2015), available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/4783c6465d9a2b5fc1257e5900242b3f/$FILE/IAM72_benc
hmarking_q_p_en.pdf, see also Sara-Jayne Clover, USPTO Still Struggling to Convince on Quality, IAM (May 11, 
2012), available at http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=4ae808a6-8240-41bf-a6e0-9b1828bfe372 
(reporting 2011 and 2010 results that report the EPO as having the highest quality rankings) 
277 Id.  
278 Id.  
279 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
280 Drahos, supra note ___, at 157. 
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the system, to the extent it reflects a legitimate mismatch between product and patent lifecycles, 
as discussed below, other ways of addressing this mismatch that are more narrowly tailored 
would be preferable. However, if the resistance to curtailing continuations is based on the 
perception that the USPTO makes a lot of mistakes in examination, it is worth considering 
whether a commitment to fewer mistakes through a greater investment could offset this 
resistance.  
The benefits of thoroughly considering prior art when a patent is examined, rather than 
later in the patent’s life, are real. To probe them, we took patents that had been the subject of a 
finally decided inter partes review challenge as of summer 2015 (N=311), and determined that 
over half of them (N=169) had a European counterpart application. Of these 169 applications, 
less than half have matured into European patents.282 This means that, though most of the claims 
that have been reviewed in the IPR proceedings have been invalidated completely by the Board, 
many never even made it out of the European Patent Office, and were rejected much earlier. It is 
also notable that, while US examiners cited non-patent literature in 16% of the US applications, 
EPO relied on non-patent literature 30% of the time, and the PTAB relied on non-patent 
literature in its final decision in 40% of these cases, by our count.283 According to a study by 
John King, a 1% increase in examination hours might reduce the amount of litigation by an 
estimated 3.94 cases per year. Whether this a good deal, of course, depends on how much the 
increased costs and how much the reduction nets are.284  
In recent years, the USPTO has recognized that patent quality is a major priority, and 
announced initiatives around search and non-patent references. During the Obama 
administration, the USPTO has made significant efforts to increase the stock of available non-
patent references, noting that “the most relevant information about a particular technology in an 
application is sometimes difficult for examiners to locate and use. Because this information often 
resides with the technical and scientific community, crowdsourcing and third-party submissions 
are promising ways to uncover hard-to-find prior art,” and securing agreements from a number 
of companies to provide hard-to-find references such as manuals to the office.285 In 2010, the 
Office created the Patent Examiner Technical Training Program (PETTP), in order to help patent 
examiners keep up with fast-changing technological fields, inviting technologists, engineers, and 
other experts to provide relevant technical training and guidance to patent examiners,286 and 
hundreds of companies have participated.287 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
281 Steve Blount & Louis S. Zarfas, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a 
Patent That a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PTO SOC’Y. 11, 13 (1999). 
282 Author’s analysis [Sept 2002 Sample] 
283 Author’s analysis  
284 JOHN L. KING, ''Patent Examination Procedures and Patent Quality,'' IN PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 54-73, (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen Merrill eds., 2003). 
285 USPTO, Calling on the Crowd to Help Increase Patent Quality (Mar. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/calling_on_the_crowd_to1 
286 Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 178 (Sep. 15, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-09-
15/pdf/2010-23006.pdf 
287 USPTO, PETTP 2015 Companies and Speaker(s), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patent-
examiner-technical-training-program/pettp-2015-companies-and-speakers (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) 
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But the low citation of non-patent literature provided to Examiners already through 
applicant disclosures casts serious doubt that greater access alone to references, without more 
time to consider them, will translate into the more robust consideration of relevant references. 
Fortunately, the examiner-cited non-patent literature metric, and progress on this dimension, can 
independently be measured over time, using the techniques described in this article. In this way, 
it has several advantages over some of the metrics discussed at the outset of this article. Unlike 
grant rates, which reflect not only the quality of examination but also changes in the law and the 
quality of applicant submission, the references that an examiner reviews and cites are largely 
within the examiner’s control. Citation behavior is also observable for all patents and immune 
from the selection issues that accompany court and PTAB- reversals. Comparisons against an 
EPO benchmark are also possible, as we have demonstrated. Finally, as a process, rather than 
outcome based metric, Examiner citation of non-patent literature can be measured and tracked in 
real-time, at the granular level of an art unit, class, or even examiner, enabling progress to be 
measured.  
Being able to track the benefits associated with a greater investment in quality will be 
important because, just as the downstream benefits of increased quality are real, the upfront costs 
of increased quality could also be significant. If all US cases received a sixfold increase in the 
amount of time allocated to search, and allocated a three-person panel to each case, for example, 
holding all other things equal, the growth in costs and backlog and examination backlog could 
also be considerable. There are two ways of limiting these effects, however. 
First, more time could be allocated selectively, to give examiners more time, for example, 
to consider international search results, or non-patent literature in particular. The applications 
that are the subject of international search are more valuable, insofar as they reflect a greater 
investment of resources by the applicant, and therefore are likely to be the ones that applicants 
want to be sure will withstand later challenges, and any supplemental fees could be passed on to 
applicants, particularly large ones. The examination units that feature the cases where missing 
non-patent literature is most likely to matter could also get more time. These could include the 
USPTO art units that have the most patents invalidated at the PTAB, on the basis that they are 
novel or obvious, or which have the highest litigation hazard,288 or which show the greatest gaps 
when compared to their EPO counterparts. Sorting for greater scrutiny in these ways has the 
benefit of incorporating insights from related and past patterns of examination and litigation.  
Another risk is that, higher costs, if passed on directly to applicants, could 
disproportionately impact those who are more sensitive to them, including start-ups and small 
and medium sized enterprises.289 Low filing fees have been the feature of the US patent system 
                                                            
288 See, e.g. Josh Lerner, the Litigation of Financial Innovations (NBER Working Paper No. 14324, 2008), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14324 (documenting that financial patents are 27 to 39 times more likely to be 
litigated than average patents), James E. Bessen & Brian J. Love, Make the Patent'Polluters' Pay: Using Pigovian 
Fees to Curb Patent Abuse, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 84 (2013) (suggesting the idea of using hazard rates to 
determine) 
289 Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Poterrie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand for Patents, 
74 OXFORD BULL. OF ECON. AND STAT. 58 (2010).   
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for many years,290 and they facilitate greater access to the patent system.  However, there is no 
reason that the costs of higher quality standards must be borne disproportionately by small and 
medium enterprises, and a number of schemes could be used to prevent this result; indeed, the 
fee increases that the USPTO introduced following passage of the America Invents Act actually 
reduced the fees for the smallest applicants, “microentities” that are now entitled to a 75% 
discount off examination fees, while it raised them for larger entities.291 We would favour 
continuing to distribute future application rate increases in this way, that is to say, 
disproportionally on larger companies, for whom an additional incremental patent filing, on a 
portfolio of thousands, is likely to matter less to the health of the company than for a company 
with a small portfolio.  
There are a number of arguments that fee rises should, all things being equal, take place 
during the maintenance, rather than examination phase of a patent. First, administrative fees at 
the examination stage are only one component of the total cost to the applicant, as the cost of 
preparing an application currently far outstrips patent office costs on the average application, 
reducing their impact.292 Second, although raising fees at the examination stage can also reduce 
congestion and increase the quality of submitted patents, studies that have looked at changing 
patent filing behaviour by adjusting patent filing fees, including some by several of us, aren’t 
encouraging.293 Increasing fees after a patent has issued, rather than before it, aligns the private 
costs with the costs to society.294  We consider this policy lever in the next section. 
IV. Post-Grant Quality Mechanisms 
Because a patent’s value only emerges over time, the point of a patent’s grant (or denial) 
can both be thought of as “too late” to make a difference, since the patent has already issued (or 
denied) as well as “too early” to know whether the patent actually matters. During the post-grant 
period, the ability of members of the public to ask Patent Office judges to take a closer look at an 
issued patent, through post-grant review procedures available both in the EPO, and in the US, is 
a critical check on patent quality. In the US, post-grant review is expensive, costing each side in 
                                                            
290 Drahos, supra note __ at 99-109 (describing US fees are set below UK fees at the outset, in 1790, and lower than 
most European countries, for the first half of the 19th century). 
291 See 78 FR 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013).   
292 Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Poterrie, supra note ___ at ___. 
293 See, e.g. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
111, 114 (2004) (finding a short-term price elasticity of patent fees of only -0.03), Rassenfosse & Van Pottelsberghe 
de la Potterie, USPTO Section 10 Fee Setting— Description of Elasticity Estimates, USPTO (2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/AC54_Final_Elasticity_Supplement.pdf (finding a 
short-term price elasticity of pre-grant fees of just -.09, but a long run price elasticity of -.30); Petra Moser, How Do 
Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World's Fair, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 1214, 
1221 (2005) (“Although the upfront costs of patenting were extremely high in Britain, at the equivalent of 37,000 
current U.S. dollars but modest in the United States (at 618 U.S. dollars), the share of innovations that were patented 
was similar in Britain and in the United States: 11.1 percent in Britain compared to only 14.2 percent in the United 
States. Moreover, British and American inventors chose to patent (and not to patent) in the same industries”) 
294 See e.g. de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Poterrie, supra note ___. (arguing that when there is limited 
information by the time of filing to assess an invention’s value, it is better to raise fees as time goes on, rather than at 
the outset) 
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a review hundreds of thousands of dollars to complete.295 It is also narrow, only enabling review 
on certain grounds or under certain circumstances.296 As a result, although generally justified 
only for patents that are the subject of an active litigation or dispute.297 In Europe, for example, 
whose well-regarded “opposition” system provided one model for the design of the current US 
system,298 the share of patents subject to post-grant review is about 5%.299 Thus, while 
considered the primary mechanism of post-grant patent quality control, post-grant reviews can 
only provide limited relief.  
In this Part, rather than focusing only the few patents that are contested, we consider 
ways of influencing the quality and quantity of the majority of patents that are not. For example, 
the patent term of 20 years is longer than the lifecycle of many products, as discussed below. But 
relatively low US renewal fees enable patent holders to hold on to their patents for longer. In this 
subsection, we discuss adjusting renewal fees and several other “post-grant” quality levers to 
reward patent owners for voluntarily reducing the risks associated with their patents and putting 
the public on notice concerning the patents its owners are practicing or planning to enforce. 
Consistent with the use of patents for many purposes, many of them non-exclusionary, we 
believe that patentees would respond to these incentives and therefore, many would voluntarily 
opt into reduced effective terms beyond the life of a product covered by a patent.  
A. Aligning Maintenance Fee Policy with Social Welfare 
After a patent is granted, its owners must pay to keep it in force. United States 
“maintenance fees” were introduced to the US in 1980; 300 before that, the owners of a patent 
were automatically entitled to the full term. The change was dramatic when it took place – 
following the introduction of fees, the growth in patents abruptly stopped, as expiring patents 
offset new patents.301 In the same vein, changes to current maintenance fees, if significant 
enough, would impact the quality and quantity of patents in force. Right now, US fees are among 
the cheapest in the world, on a per capita GDP basis. (FIG___) US patents are also kept in force 
longer than other leading jurisdictions,302 leading to a longer period of monopoly and higher 
supracompetitive prices. 
Some inventions arguably deserve a longer exclusivity term than 20 years. Budish and his 
co-authors have noticed that company cancer researchers tend to invest less in earlier-stage 
                                                            
295 Jay P. Kesan, Arti K. Rai, & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERK. TECH. L.J. 45, 55 (2016). 
296 As described in Chien & Helmers, supra note ____, post-grant review is only available for the first nine months 
after issue, CBM review is only available for financial services patents, and only novelty and obviousness can be 
revisited in inter partes review. 
297 See Id. (documenting the high proportion of IPRed patents that are the subject of parallel litigation, and the low 
percentage of litigated patents that is the subject of a post-grant review) 
298 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 438. 
47 (2012). 
299 See references described, e.g. in Chien & Helmers, supra note ___. 
300 Marco et al, supra note ____. (citing 94 Stat. 3017 § 41; 35 USC 41) 
301 Id. FIG. 6 (Annual Count of Patents in Force) 
302 IP5 report, supra note ___ at FIG 4.8 (showing the USPTO, by year 20 after the filing date, to have the highest 
rate of renewal (~48%), followed by the JPO (~27%), SIPO, EPO, and KIPO.) 
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cancer drugs than late-stage cancer drugs because they are much slower to bring to the market, 
leaving a limited amount of time to recoup development expenses.303 But many product 
lifecycles are shorter than the 20-year term offered by a patent.304 During a typical 5-year period, 
two-thirds of US manufacturing firms switch their products,305 and in the US, people replace 
their cellphones every two to three years.306 According to a study by Bilir, the shortest product 
life cycles are in the electronics machinery (6.7 years) and computer and office equipment (8.4 
years) industries, and the longest product lifecycles are in non-electric heating equipment (10.9 
years) and metal cans and shipping containers (10.6).307 Broda and Weinstein find that computer 
software ranks third highest in turnover of the 100 product types they studied.308 The 
misalignment of patent and product times in the software industry extends to the application 
process as well. In July 2016, it took about 25 months to get a patent.309 But in certain markets, 
for example, the mobile app market, “fast followers” that mimic aspects of the original are often 
introduced in less time.310 It has been reported that half of the revenue in the semiconductor 
industry is derived from products that have been on the market for less than six months.311 
One risk of patents that outlive the products they support is that they are sold to patent 
assertion entities (PAEs), or trolls and then asserted. Love has found that non-practicing entities 
disproportionately assert their patents at the end of a patent’s life, rather than the  
                                                            
303 Eric B. Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?: Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials 
(Chicago Booth Research Paper 13-79, 2013) (it takes a median of 9.1 years to conduct a study on early-stage 
prostate cancer treatment, as compared to a 12.8-month median for treatments of late-stage cancer)  
304 Roger Entner, 2014 US Mobile Phone Sales Fall by 15% and Handset Replacement Cycle Lengthens to Historic 
High, RECON ANALYTICS (Feb 10, 2015), available at http://reconanalytics.com/2015/02/2014-us-mobile-phone-
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310 Sebastian Kraaijenzank, Innovation Without Patents? Evidence from the Smartphone App Markets, 30 (2013). 
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Source: Christopher Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, 2010 and 2012 Patent Holder 
and Litigation Dataset (last updated May 28, 2014), Lex Machina, Innography, Author’s 
Analysis 
[File: Data for Histogram v3, Histogram for Maintenance and Priority] 
beginning,312 while the reverse is true of operating companies. Replicating his analysis, among 
patents litigated in 2010 and 2012, and relying on codings by Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz,313 
we find a similar pattern (FIG___) – that PAE assertions were weighted towards the later years 
of a patent’s term. Returns that outlast the original product that the patent was filed to support are 
more likely to reflect an unexpected windfall than form any incentive to innovate that a patent 
may provide. 
For a variety of reasons, then, the duration of a patent has a considerable impact on the 
costs and benefits to society associated with the patent. The longer a patent supports 
                                                            
312 Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls 
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(last updated May 28, 2013), available at http://npedata.com/article/. The authors coded each case from 2010 as 
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supracompetitive pricing, the greater the deadweight loss to society.314 Renewal fees influence a 
patentee’s decision to keep a patent in force, or not, and are an important driver of patent quality. 
Comparatively speaking, US fees are on the low to lowest end of the range on a per capita basis. 
This is because USPTO fees have been in an almost continuous decline (relative to GDP per 
capita) since 1800.315  As a result, Park has found, the US charges the least, among major 
jurisdictions, on a GDP per capita basis, to pursue and maintain a US patent, in an analysis. 
(FIG___) On an absolute basis, it costs approximately $12600 (large entity) for the full twenty-
year term,316 compared to €23855 in Europe for twenty years (approximately $26270).317 
Changing how much it costs to keep a patent in force would likely lead to the earlier expiry of 
patents that are “sitting on the shelf.”  
 
 
Includes official filing fees, agent (legal) fees, issuance fees, and maintenance fees and assumes 
large entity status and 20-year term. Excludes translation fees. Sources: Patent Office Websites 
                                                            
314 Frederick M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 422, 427 (1972) 
315 Id. at 6. 
316 See USPTO Fee Schedule, available at http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-
fee-schedule (July 1, 2015) ($280 filing fee, $600 search fee, $720 examination fee, $960 issue fee, $1,600 renewal 
fee due by 3.5 years, $3,600 renewal fee due by 7 years, $7,400 renewal fee due by 11.5 years) 
317 EPO Schedule of Fees and Expenses, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-
journal/2014/etc/se3/p1.html (2014).  
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(Official Fees Country), IMF (2014 GDP values), Park 2010 (legal fees), IMF (global inflation 
rates).  
For all of these reasons, renewal fees should be set with social welfare considerations in 
mind. Long-standing policy doesn’t fully permit the USPTO to do so, however, specifying that 
fee collections are required to be dictated by the principle of cost recovery.318 As a historical 
study documents, consistent with the US patent system’s emphasis on accessibility and 
affordability, from the beginning, “[patent] payments were not intended to exact a price for the 
patent privilege or to raise revenues for the state… rather, they were imposed to merely cover the 
administrative expenses of the office.”319 For most of the PTO’s history, the Office has been 
funded primarily with taxpayer revenues through annual appropriations legislation, not fees.320 
Since 1990, Congress has required the USPTO to be self-funded.321 Initially, Congress 
set most fees, and the USPTO was only authorized to set relatively minor fees, and make 
adjustments to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index.322 This changed with the America 
Invents Act, as Congress was seen as relatively poor steward of USPTO charges.323 Though the 
total collection must still limited to those needed to cover the “aggregate estimated costs to the 
Office for processing, activities, services and materials,”324 the USPTO now has much greater 
freedom to determine fee levels.325 To its credit, the USPTO has made the sorts of adjustments, 
directionally, that align patent fees with social welfare. It has lowered examination fees but made 
up the difference in increases to maintenance fees. 326 It has also explored, through its Chief 
Economists, the idea of limiting continuation practice by raising fees.327  
Within this ambit, if the USPTO decided to invest significantly more in upfront 
examination, for example, it could pass these expenses on to applicants, at the examination 
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phase, or patentees, in the maintenance phase. However, it would have to move cautiously when 
doing so, as there are several procedural hurdles that the USPTO would need to overcome in 
order to increase fees.  Any new fee proposals must be submitted to the Patent Public Advisory 
Committee,328and the USPTO must engage the Committee at least forty-five days before 
publishing the proposed rule and give the Committee thirty days to consider the proposal.329 The 
Committee must then hold a public hearing and produce written recommendations, which the 
USPTO must consider.330  At this point, the Director must notify Congress of the proposed 
change and publish the proposed fee in the Federal Register, along with a description of the 
reasons for the fee.331 Next, there is a public comment period of forty-five days, after which the 
fee can be published; forty-five days following publication, the rule can go into effect absent a 
congressional override.332 
There are other problems with further skewing USPTO reliance towards maintenance, 
rather than examination fees. Already, the USPTO subsidizes examination with maintenance 
fees, and small and micro-entity fees, with large entity fees.333 Wasserman and Frakes have 
found that these distortions cause the PTO, in times of urgency, to overgrant patents to large 
entities that are more likely to renew their patents.334 The USPTO is not the only governmental 
agency that is vulnerable to criticisms, at times grave, that its revenue-making authority 
interferes with fairly carrying out its mission.335 Nor is it the only government agency that has to 
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balance competing revenue pressures. However, the USPTO does appear to lack a number of the 
safeguards that others have to reduce the need to balance revenues and expenses on an annual 
basis. For example, the EPO, like the US, subsidizes examination renewal fees, and the office is 
also self-funded. But the European Patent Office also owns substantial financial assets that are 
sometimes used to supplement the funding derived from patent fees.336 In addition, the European 
Patent Convention states that the Contracting States of the EPO must finance any deficit that the 
office faces,337 an important backup source of revenue. In addition, some other permitting 
agencies receive significant funding as part of the Federal Budget, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which requested $9 billion in funding in 2012,338 and brought in just 
$252 million in fines in 2012.339 The USPTO’s ledger, in contrast, is substantially balanced. To 
enable the USPTO to operate in a way that is dictated by its mission, rather than its finances 
Congress should consider creating such buffers as well.  
B. Redesigning Renewal Fees 
 Despite these challenges, we believe there are at least two ways that US maintenance fees 
should be reconsidered. First, in line with considerations of equity, the USPTO should consider 
raising US fees to historical and global norms, and using the balance to improve patent quality in 
examination. Second, the US should consider adopting the practice of other jurisdictions of 
requiring maintenance fees to be paid yearly, rather than periodically. Right now, for example, to 
keep a European patent in force for 20 years not only costs roughly double what is costs to keep 
a US patent in force,340 but, because maintenance fees are due yearly, also requires the patentee 
to make 17 separate decisions to keep a patent in force, and to make 17 payments. In contrast, 
because in the US, the compared to making only 3 affirmative decisions to keep a US patent in 
force. The systems therefore set different defaults – in the US, for example, once the third 
payment is made, the patent defaults to staying in effect for the remaining 5+ years of its term.341 
In the EPO, if the patentee does nothing, the patent will naturally expire, unless, each of the 
remaining years in its life, the patentee pays a fee. The behavioral science literature has 
documented the power of defaults.342 When workers were automatically enrolled in savings 
plans, their participation increased from 49% to 86%.343 Defaults have also shown to be effective 
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in encouraging energy conservation.344 Support for using behavioral science insights to effect 
positive social outcomes is now embedded into the federal government.345  It would be worth 
using this power to explore the consequences of the USPTO switching to a different fee 
schedule. 
 While there is substantially more work to do before the USPTO’s renewal fee structure 
can be changed, we offer two other ways to reduce the offensive threats associated with 
particular patents while still preserving the value that patents add to their owners.  
C. Removing Offensive Threats through Defensive Only Patents  
 Concerns about patents outliving their intended purpose have been particularly acute with 
respect to software patents. As Love and others have documented, suggestions of a shortened 
software patent term have sounded from diverse source ranging from academics, Federal Circuit 
Judge Pauline Newman, activists, and Jeff Bezos.346 There are practical problems with 
mandating that software patents be given shortened terms, however, including the difficulty of 
defining what a software patent is, and the international law mandate that “patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to…the field of technology.”347 
The latter limitation, when viewed in juxtaposition with the EPO’s ban on computer program 
patents per se, suggests that any restriction on software inventions should happen at the level of 
extending protection, not the duration of protection.348  
One alternative to reducing the term of software patents is to offer holders of defensive 
patents, software or otherwise, the option to designate their patents as “defensive only.” 349 
“Defensive only” patents would be examined like ordinary patents. However, they would be 
enforceable only if a patent holder were the subject to an offensive threat, for example a demand 
letter or lawsuit. The patentholder could elect the “defensive only” designation at any time, 
entitling the owner to a discount off of any applicable fees, say 50%.350 Once the patent 
application or patent was designated as defensive, it would retain that status until lapsed. That 
way, a patentee could gain many of the advantages associated with holding a patent – signalling 
to the world innovative potential, providing a basis for financing (to some degree), and ensuring 
some measure of freedom of operation – without imposing much of the costs to society generally 
associated with patent holding. The cost savings would likely be appealing for those whose large 
patent portfolios require large payments to maintain and which pose the greatest threats to 
smaller companies. Some smaller companies may also find this option appealing in order to 
signal to their employees their commitment to open source sharing, or defensive intentions 
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though small companies may have a higher proportion of crown jewel and fewer “defensive” 
patents in their portfolios.  
While this idea may sound radical, it is not. Under Germany’s “License of Right” (LOR) 
scheme, a patent owner that declares that anyone can practice the invention in return for 
reasonable compensation receives a 50% discount off their maintenance fees;351 the UK has long 
featured a similar scheme.352 In addition, a number of the most innovative companies in the 
world have already made public commitments to commit their patents to defensive uses only. 
Under the Inventor Protection Agreement (IPA) adopted by Twitter, the company has promised 
to its employees that it will only use their patents for “defensive purposes,”353 a commitment that 
has been used to attract talent and build culture at the firm.354 Tesla has made a similar 
commitment, to “open source” its patents over electric vehicles and battery storage technology 
and make them freely available except to those who assert their patents against the company.355 
IBM, which has been the top filer for patents for years, as well as Sony, Google, LG Electronics, 
Canon, and about 2,050 other companies356 are signatories to the Open Invention Network’s 
(OIN) “non-aggression” pact, which commits them to granting royalty-free patent licenses over 
Linux technology to other signatories.357 These various pledges and promises demonstrate the 
strong interest in defensive uses of patents, as well as shortcomings with existing solutions – like 
other promises, one-way pledges are unenforceable in the absence of reasonable reliance.358  
Offering a defensive only patent option would enable sorting between high and low value 
(defensive only) patents. However, unlike gold-plating during examination, a defensive patent 
option would be available any time, including after the patent has been granted and more 
information about the patent’s value has emerged. It would not require development of a second, 
heightened tier of review. And though it should appeal most to companies that engage in 
defensive patenting, which are concentrated in the tech sector, it would be voluntary, thereby 
avoiding running afoul of bans on technological discrimination or the requirement of a 20-year 
patent term enshrined in international law.359 
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According to surveys, 45-60% of companies acquire patents for defensive reasons, 
though even more obtain patents to prevent copying.360 But Tesla’s experience is instructive. The 
company originally got patents, “out of concern that the big car companies would copy our 
technology.” However, over time, Tesla discovered “[w]e couldn’t have been more wrong. The 
unfortunate reality is the opposite: electric car programs [] at the major manufacturers are small 
to non-existent.”361 However, just because Tesla is abandoning the desire to prevent copying, it 
isn’t abandoning its patents. Instead, it has used them to encourage adoption of its technology 
and for defensive purposes,362 has also used its patents to secure financing.363 Though perhaps 
not the primary reason Tesla acquired patents, these non-exclusionary uses promote innovation 
at the company. In the same way, companies may hold their patents for non-defensive reasons, 
but then transition to a primarily defensive purpose over time. 
D. Fixing the Marking Requirement364  
 I conclude this Part by considering one other fairly obvious, but largely overlooked way 
that the risks associated with patents staying in force can be reduced. Although patent law is a 
strict liability offense, the intuition that patentees have the obligation to let the world know about 
the patents they plan to enforce, so that others may avoid infringing, unawares, is enshrined in 
the law through a doctrine called patent “marking.”  
According to this doctrine, to recover damages during the period of infringement, those 
who practice their inventions are required to put the world on notice by marking products or their 
packaging in order.365 Typically this comes in the form of a “Patent Number” listing. In the 
absence of marking, an infringer doesn’t owe damages unless they have actual, legal notice. The 
purpose of the marking requirement is to prevent innocent infringement and encourage patentees 
to give notice of the existence of their patents.366 Over time, however, this important safeguard 
has been quietly eroded. A 1936 case ruled that, for practical reasons, the marking requirement 
did not to apply to those who did not practice their patented inventions367 or to process patents.368 
As a result, those who might otherwise have notice of the patents that its holders seek to enforce, 
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or at least may seek to recover damages on – the only legal benefit that marking confers – no 
longer have the benefit of that notice in connection with process or unpracticed patents.  
A restored marking requirement – which would require some sort of effort and notice to 
the world with respect to patents that the patentee seeks to enforce – would, in the same way as a 
defensive only option, or gold-plating enable the patentholder to differentiate between patents. 
Just as a defensive only patent would identify the patents that a patentholder does not intend to 
enforce, a “marked” patent would identify to the world the patents that the patentholder does 
intend to claim damages on. Knowing what patents have a higher chance of being enforced can 
limit the risks associated with poor patent quality.  Just like the election of a “defensive only” 
patent option, the decision to mark a patent separates it from others, and enables the efficient 
allocation of resources towards the patents that matter. Follow on innovators can allocate more 
resources towards reviewing the validity of the patent, or designing around it, for example.  
Closing this loophole as others have called for,369 and restoring the notice requirement for all 
patents, would in this way reduce the risks associated with low patent quality.  
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